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Abstract 
In order to provide appropriate theoretical background, the construct of safety culture was discussed. 
Mechanisms of this construct were presented through the analysis of several descriptive or 
assessment models, and one definition from literature was given.  
Safety culture is a multi-faceted construct gathering values, beliefs, perceptions, etc., within an 
organization. It was decided to focus this project on safety climate, which corresponds to the 
perceptible manifestations of safety culture.  
The distinction between safety climate and safety culture being regularly missed in literature, the 
differences between both of these constructs was emphasized.  
 
Assessment of safety climate was performed through an online survey. Questions were based on 
Reason’s model and Parker’s framework, which described five typologies for 11 concrete and 7 
abstract aspects. The survey was sent to every person linked to a laboratory and results focused on 
people who stated laboratory-work as their main occupation.   
Results of the survey indicate respondents adopt generally a “generative” approach (the best typology 
defined by Reason) for the assessed dimensions. However, it was determined that each School 
presents different strengths and weaknesses.  
It was determined that this framework could be applied at EPFL but needs to be redesigned to be 
more accurate regarding EPFL organization. Certain typologies’ description appeared to not be 
necessarily relevant or adequately formulated. A review of the formulation with academic HSE experts 
appeared to be necessary.  
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient’s value is 0.75 which indicates an acceptable internal consistency, which 
means this survey measures the same construct.  
A global HSE score has been calculated within lab-workers of EPFL, according to the “Hearts and Minds 
– Understanding your culture” brochure, resulting to a score of 3.53 (max score: 5). 
As respondents were all willing to participate to this survey, a strong positive bias is suspected and 
therefore in depth assessment are necessary to validate this statement. Group discussions within 
research units could be a solution to prevent this bias. 
Finally, the survey highlights three major improvement opportunities, concerning the reporting of 
accidents, the safety training and the role of CoSecs. Reflection paths are proposed to extend the 
analysis of these dimensions and improve them.  
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1 Introduction 
Accidents’ impact can vary from slight damage to tremendous catastrophe, depending on the involved 
hazards and the context. High-risk industries (nuclear or chemical for instance) present large potential 
impacts due to their activities. Thus, these industries have been particularly focused on safety 
development to prevent such catastrophes. 
Safety in industries has been developed in three phases, starting with the improvement of technical 
equipment to limit failure rate. Once the induced accident rate decrease stabilized, System of 
Management of Safety (SMS) have been developed in the purpose of safety improvement through 
prevention, means and individuals. The next step of safety development concerned the organizational 
aspect of safety, which is the subject of this report (figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1 Evolution of frequency and gravity of incidents versus time  and the factors of risks (ICSI, 2017) 
 
Safety culture is generally more developed in industry than academia, and recently, awareness of the 
importance of organizational factors in safety performance starts raising in academia.  
 
This report will first focus on the theoretical background underlying this construct. Then we will focus 
on the possible application and assessment at EPFL.  
 
1.1 Emergence of safety culture in industries 
In order to introduce this concept, a chronology presents the context of the appearance of safety 
culture and organizational factors. Two case studies are detailed to emphasize the differences 
between technical, human and organization factors. 
1.1.1 Chronology 
March 28th, 1979, Three Mile Island (US) Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) suffered a major dysfunction on 
the secondary non-nuclear section of the plant. A chain of events, detailed below, drove the core of 
the plant to partially melt down. Although radioactive releases had no detectable health effects, “it 
was [at the time] the most serious accident in US in commercial nuclear power plant industry” (US 
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NRC, 2014). The investigations concluded that misunderstanding and misinformation of this event led 
to several decisions that aggravated the situation.  
Critical role of human operator was then identified as a major key in safety concept of an industrial 
plant.  
 
April 26th, 1986, Ukraine. A test was performed on reactor N°4 of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. After 
a serie of errors, including violations of the procedures guarantying reactor’s integrity, the worst 
nuclear accident in history happened. (IAEA, 2017) 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigated the accident and the terms “safety 
culture” appeared for the first time.  
 
After this moment, safety management in industries changed. Organizational factors are now seen as 
a major safety issue due to the potential impact that might occur in case of failure. A major accident 
can lead to important financial impact (reparations, victims’ compensations, production losses, etc.) 
and to an important impact on public image (reputation, trust). The latter being also paramount for 
governmental organizations.  
Poor safety culture also led to other serious accidents (Bhopal, Challenger, Piper Alpha, …). The Bhopal 
case is presented below as a case study to exhibit the characteristics of a poor safety culture.  
 
Following these accidents, safety culture has then been deeply investigated to understand the 
mechanism that lead to good safety performance in term of organizational aspects and its 
implementation in industry. Some of the resulting models and tools are presented in latter part of this 
report. 
1.1.2 Case study: Bhopal accident 
This first case study is based on an accident which occurred in an industrial plant and is considered 
as the largest industrial disaster. (BBC News, 2010) 
1.1.2.1 The accident 
The Union carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, used methyl isocyanate (MIC). This compound is 
highly volatile and toxic. Financial health of the company was not good and cuts were done on safety 
and small deviations were considered normal and acceptable (minor leaks, odours, etc.). 
In the night of 2nd-3rd December 1986, a leak of MIC was notified to the control room due to odour 
detection.  
The operator searched the installation and concluded to a small leak.  
More calls notified the control room as odour expanded. The operator investigated more deeply the 
MIC installation, and noticed a tank was vibrating and releasing heat, sign of exothermic reaction. 
Back in control room, the operator started the emergency procedure. Vent gas was directed to a gas 
scrubber with caustic soda. The scrubber malfunctioned and was not able to neutralize the gas. 
Further investigations determined afterwards that this scrubber was not designed for major leak and 
could never have neutralized such a leak.  
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The second safety barrier was a flare tower which was supposed to burn the vent gas. It was 
disconnected at this moment.  
The third and last safety barrier was the water curtains which were deployed by firemen of the 
company. Unfortunately, those were under-dimensioned and the water streams could not reach the 
top of the chimney, where gas escaped.  
At this moment, nothing could be done to avoid the gas to impact the population. The communication 
to the authorities were inefficient and the alarm went late to the hospitals and the police force.  
On this single night, 4’000 persons died of direct effects of the MIC exposure, 8’000 in the following 
couple of weeks, and 8’000 others have died since from gas-related diseases. 
1.1.2.2 Triggering events 
An unclogging operation were performed in the unit when water flowed back in the MIC tank. Pipes 
were interconnected to improve efficiency and flexibility of production. A check valve was supposed 
to be present, but was not. Nitrogen inerting was out of function during several days and the situation 
has not been reported.   
The water flow entrained rust of the pipe, which contained iron, a catalyst of the decomposition 
reaction of MIC.  
1.1.2.3 Analysis of the accident 
The chain of events leading to this accident revealed that there were not only technical failures, but 
some less perceptible dysfunctions concerning management of safety in this particular plant.   
Amongst the different dysfunctions we can highlight the lack of anticipation (“what can go wrong?”), 
the acceptance of deviations (“Small disturbances are OK”, for example small leakes), safety cuts and 
complacency (“Nothing serious happened recently, we can reduce our efforts”) and a bad 
communication within the company and with external stakeholders (authorities and hospitals for 
example). 
Those dysfunctions have major similarities; this concerns general operations of the company and are 
not due to one operator error. There come from the term “[safety] culture”. This extreme case has 
been selected to emphasize the importance of safety culture, but it is important to keep in mind that 
safety culture concerns every safety aspect of an organization’s life.   
 
1.2 Safety Culture in academic institutions 
The concept of safety culture is quite anchored in most of high-risk industries and has been well 
explored by researchers, academia exhibits a strong improvement potential. Main reason is the 
organizational difference between both of these environments.   
Several serious, even lethal, accidents occurred in academic institutions in the last decade: 
- University of California Los Angeles, USA, 2008: Ignition of tert-butyl lithium and chemical fire, 
one chemistry research assistant suffered major burns; she died few days later. UCLA was 
fined USD 31’000.- and the professor settled an agreement to escape prison. (Kemsley, 2009) 
- TexasTech University, USA, 2010: Explosion of nickel hydrazine perchlorate derivative, a 
graduate student lost three fingers, suffered burns on hand and face and injuries on one eye. 
Improvement of Safety Culture at EPFL  Master Thesis 2018 
10 
 
The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) concluded to a lack of good practices in the university. (US 
CSB, 2010) 
- University of Hawaii, USA, 2016: Explosion of a mixture O2/H2, a postdoctoral researcher lost 
her arm. University of California Center for Laboratory Safety (UCCLS) concluded the 
underlying cause “of the accident was failure to recognize and control the hazards of an 
explosive mixture of hydrogen and oxygen”. (Kemsley, University of Hawaii lab explosion likely 
originated in electrostatic discharge, 2016) 
These examples show that severe accidents can occur in academic institutions. However, 
consequences of accidents in university are relatively less dramatic than industrial accidents (example: 
Bhopal, India, 1984: a leak of methyl isocyanate killed 4’000 persons in one night, thousands of others 
died from diseases due to gas exposure).  
UCLA accident is detailed below as a case study to expose the failures in organizational aspects of 
safety which led to the accident. 
The difference of considerations regarding safety between industry and academic could ensue from 
the hazards perception and the scale of potential accidents and their gravity.   
This point will not be discussed here. The differences of both these environments will be discussed to 
understand why the industrial safety culture researches cannot be directly transposed and applied. 
1.2.1 Case study: UCLA accident – ignition of pyrophoric 
This case study focuses on an accident in an academic institution. Even if the consequences are less 
dramatic that the consequences of an industrial disaster as presented above, this accident had an 
important media coverage. The analysis is based on an EPFL-DSPS course dispensed to safety 
coordinators (CoSecs) (DSPS-SCC, 2017). 
1.2.1.1 The accident 
December 29th, 2008 at University of California in Los Angeles (UCLA), a staff research assistant was 
working in a laboratory in molecular Sciences building. She had at this moment a bachelor degree in 
chemistry.  
Throughout the accident she was manipulating, with a syringe, tert-butyl-lithium, a pyrophoric 
substance igniting spontaneously when in contact with air. The plunger came out of the syringe and 
the substance ignited.  
An open bottle of hexane was present, even if it was not part of the experiment. The fumes ignited 
too, as did Sheri’s clothes. She was not wearing a lab coat. The emergency shower has not been used. 
She suffered of serious burns on half her body and died eighteen days later.  
1.2.1.2 Triggering event 
The direct cause of the accident lays in the mishandling of the syringe. However, a plunger coming out 
of the syringe is supposed to be an incident rather than an accident, moreover a lethal accident. This 
incident has been aggravated with hexane fumes.  
1.2.1.3 Analysis of the accident 
Similarly to the Bhopal accident, but to a smaller scale, analysis of this accident revealed organizational 
issues. 
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Accidents and near-misses were not reported, audits corrective measures were not systematically 
applied, no specific training were proposed for manipulating of dangerous chemical compounds, 
supervision presented deficiencies.  
Even if the professor in charge of this laboratory faced charges of felony, it is impossible to consider 
one unique person responsible for the mentioned dysfunctions. They are the product of the 
organizational context from which ensue such standards and practices. 
 
1.3 Differences between academia and industry 
Academia and industry are two different environments with their own particularities. As safety culture 
has been essentially developed in high-risk industry, it is important to detail the differences between 
both these environments in order to understand why we cannot directly consider safety culture in 
academic institutions as it is considered in industry. 
 
Hierarchical organization 
Industries have a top-to-bottom approach and centralized power, where accountability between the 
different levels of responsibilities are clear. Power and leadership are also important factors to spread 
practices within a company. 
In academia the power is very scattered and decentralized; Chemical Safety Board US (CSB), an 
American federal agency, brought to light the issue of “fiefdoms”, considering the independency of 
professor regarding their laboratory’s organization (US CSB, 2010). 
 
Purpose 
An industry’s main concern lies in profitability. Thus, efforts are made to avoid useless expenditures 
and ensuring infrastructural integrity of the plant of the company. DuPont claim they demonstrated 
that a good safety performance is strongly correlated with profitability (DuPont, 2015).  
Also public image is an important consideration within companies. For instance, a serious accident can 
weaken trust of people in the company, provoke authorities’ sanctions, etc. Thus industry tend to 
accept safety as an important factor protecting the company’s sustainability. 
Academia focuses on research and new discoveries, thus the impact of profitability, in terms of money, 
is almost negligible, to a certain point. However, the potential relationship between research 
performance and safety is to be discussed. 
 
Complexity 
Several factors also influence the complexity of academia regarding industry. First, turn-over of 
researchers is high, with more than 80% of renewal amongst researchers within four years. Also these 
researchers, in particular PhD students, have a higher level of formation, and a smaller work 
experience.  
Hazards emerge due to the dynamism of the activities, with introduction of new technologies, 
processes in the development phase, fast evolution or redirecting of projects and the wide range of 
Improvement of Safety Culture at EPFL  Master Thesis 2018 
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researches. For instance, more than 80’000 different chemical compounds are used at EPFL (internal 
SCC documentation). 
1.4 EPFL Organization 
This project focuses on the safety culture within EPFL academic research units and it is important to 
briefly present the organization of EPFL regarding safety in order to harmonize the used terminology. 
At EPFL, hundreds of research units are active on various topics and are on the responsibility of a 
professor. They are gathered within 23 institutes, gathered in turn into 5 schools (Life Sciences, Basic 
Sciences, Engineering, Architecture Civil and Environmental Engineering, Computer and 
Communication Sciences) and 2 colleges (Management of Technology and College of Humanities).  
The presidency of EPFL and 6 Vice-presidencies manage the transverse services (General Counsel, 
Development Office, Human Resources and Operations (VP-HRO), etc.) and form the Direction of the 
EPFL. The Direction is responsible for Occupational Safety and Health and delegates tasks to different 
stakeholders.  
Deans or college directors are responsible at the first level of the application of safety prevention 
measures. Research units’ heads are responsible for setting up an organization able to fulfill safety 
specifications. They take support from the safety coordinators (CoSec), generally a member of the 
unit. 
Safety, Prevention and Health Domain (DSPS) supervise organization of safety in schools and colleges 
and depends of the VP-HRO. It takes support from the CoSec (DSST, 2012). 
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2 Theoretical background: the construct of Safety Culture 
Safety culture is a recent concept coined in 1987 from the investigations of Chernobyl disaster. Since 
then, many researchers focused on this subject through different aspects (psychological, 
anthropological, sociological, etc.). No universally accepted definition has been found, however some 
tendencies can be highlighted.  
In 1991, Cox and Cox provided a definition: “safety culture reflects the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, 
and values that employees share in relation to safety”. This definition is presented, assuming it 
provides sufficient information to approach the subject and remain clear. 
However, many different definitions have been given (over twenty). (Guldenmund F. W., 2000).  
2.1 Culture versus Climate  
Previous case studies exhibit the fact that [safety] culture is deeply engraved within an organization. 
However, another term was defined in 1951 and used in research of organizational factors: the 
climate. Climate directly refers to the perceptions of a construct.  
It is accepted that the confusion between culture and safety is common, even in specialized 
publications (Guldenmund F. W., 2000) so this part will attend to establish a preliminary basis to 
differentiate these constructs. Defining clearly the difference between these constructs is not the aim 
of this work and it is advised to read the review of Guldenmund, 2000 for further discussion and 
information.  
Soe et al. associated “culture” with the words “deep”, “stable” and “qualitative” while climate is 
referred by “superficial”, “snapshot” and “quantitative”, exhibiting the difference of tangibility of 
these constructs (Seo & M. R. Torabi, 2004).  
Perceptibility 
Climate is defined as the direct perceptions employees have regarding safety and organizational 
factors. Culture incorporate the underlying factors that are not directly perceived. These factors are 
deeply anchored in people minds, sometimes unconsciously, and in the company history. Culture is 
also tacitly transmitted with time to new employees.  
Stability over years 
Culture is considered as a very stable trait of an organization while climate can be more fluctuating. 
De Cock and al. stated culture changes occur in at least five years (Guldenmund F. W., 2000). On the 
other hand, safety perceptions, i.e. climate, can change right after a punctual event (major accident, 
new procedure, etc.) without involving a change in culture. (Schoeffel & Thompson, 2017) 
To emphasize these sustainability, authors associate the culture with the “personality” of an 
organization and reflects what “is” an organization, while climate refer to the “mood” and what “has” 
the organization. 
Causality 
In his review of literature, Guldenmund concluded that culture presently “refer[s] to a global, 
integrating concept underlying most organisational events and processes” (despite this definition was 
given to climate at the beginning), while climate concerns the “overt manifestation of culture within 
an organization”. The causal relationship between culture and climate is therefore spotlighted as 
climate ensues culture.  
Improvement of Safety Culture at EPFL  Master Thesis 2018 
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Inclusion 
Now we will focus on the separation between these constructs. 
According to Cox & Cox (1991), safety culture can be defined as the reflection of “the attitudes, beliefs 
perceptions, and values that employees share in relation to safety”, while safety climate has been 
defined by “the objective measurements of attitudes and perceptions towards occupational health 
and safety issues.” (Guldenmund F. W., 2000) 
For this project I consider safety climate as a part of safety culture, representing the perceptible and 
measurable manifestations of it. 
Multi-faceted 
Culture incorporates different dimensions of organizational aspects such as values, beliefs, practices, 
history, etc. These different facets of culture make that several approaches are needed to assess 
culture (audit, inquiry, group discussions, etc.) 
Climate is one of these aspects, gathering the perceptible manifestations of culture, and can be 
assessed through quantitative surveys.  
The iceberg metaphor 
To illustrate this construct, we can consider the safety culture as an iceberg. Safety climate would be 
the emerged part that can be directly observed and immerged part would be the essential part of the 
iceberg, which guarantee the stability of the ice. Both parts influence each other and are influenced 
by the surrounding water (i.e. their environment). These interactions are exhibited in the reciprocal 
model, presented further in this report.  
 
 
Figure 2 Culture vs climate: the iceberg metaphor 
 
Followings these statements it appears that safety culture cannot be measured by one unique tool 
but need in depth assessment. Such assessment will need a tremendous workload so it has been 
decided to focus this project on the assessment of safety climate in academic research units.  
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2.2 The different models of safety culture 
We will focus on some existing models that have been developed to describe and/or assess safety 
culture or safety climate. Five models will be presented and compared to assess their possible 
implementation and use in an academic context such as EPFL.  
As discussed above, safety culture is a multi-faceted and intangible construct; therefore, models differ 
regarding the authors’ background and should be seen as complementary rather than contradictory.    
 
2.2.1 Layers models 
The layer model is based on the differences of perceptibility to the different components of the safety 
culture structured as layers of an onion. This structure was proposed in 1982 by Deal & Kennedy 
(Guldenmund F. W., 2000) and several authors adapted this model to their observations, giving 
different meanings to outer layers. This model describes organizational culture and can be applied to 
safety culture. 
During this work, Schein’s model was considered as the terminology seems more easy to understand 
for non-sociologist. Schein defined three layers, the “Artefacts”, the “Espoused values” and the “Basic 
underlying assumptions” (from the outer layer to the core).  
- Artefacts: These are the directly perceptible manifestations of safety culture:” what is done”. 
A new employee of an organization will quickly perceive these. Artefacts can be assessed 
through surveys. 
- Espoused values: These are the messages transmitted by the management and are the values 
adopted and supported within an organization (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002):” 
what we say”. Espoused values can be assessed through individual interviews. 
- Basic underlying assumptions: These are the deepest layer of culture. It includes the 
fundamental belief that an organization subscribe in an unconscious way. They reflect the 
history, the beliefs and assumptions of founders and key leaders of an organization. Groups 
discussions can allow to assess this layer. 
It is important to notice that the terms « Artefacts » and « Espoused values » are the reflection of the 
caution given to the meaning of outer layers and the fact that “what is seen and heard is not always a 
true expression of culture” (Guldenmund F. W., 2000). In other words, differences can occur between 
what the management say (e.g. “safety is the more important”) and what they really do and what the 
workers feel (e.g. “we have to be productive no matter what”). 
Schein’s model has been used by IAEA to develop an assessment model for safety culture in high risk 
organizations, i.e. organizations which should have a low failure rate and high safety level. Several 
dimensions have been described and attributed to the corresponding layer (International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 2002). 
The model consists in a three-stages scale regarding the main considerations in safety assessment 
within an organization. 
- Stage 1: Safety is based on rules and regulations: This stage includes organizations that see 
“safety as an external requirement, and not as an aspect of conduct that will allow it to 
succeed”. Compliance is then reached through numerous rules to limit deviation of processes. 
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- Stage 2: Safety is considered an organizational goal: At this stage safety performance is 
independent of external requirements and is reached through goal and targets. 
 
- Stage 3: Safety can always be improved: The idea of continuous improvement is adopted and 
applied to safety and there is a lot of emphasis on management style, communication, 
training, etc.  
The table 1 shows an example of a set of layers that might be expected within an organization rules-
based. This illustrates how basic underlying assumptions can influence artefacts (i.e. the climate) and 
the difference of perceptibility between these layers. 
Table 1 Example of layers for a rules-based organization 
Schein’s layers Rules-based stage 
Artefacts Numerous rules for safety compliance 
Espoused values Zero tolerance for safety deficiencies 
Basic assumptions [Management thinks] People are undisciplined 
and self-interested; they cause accidents. 
  
In the context of this project, this model is particularly interesting to illustrate the depth of safety 
culture and the perceptions problematic regarding the different facets of this constructs. However, 
this model incorporates numerous sociological notions and concepts that are difficult to assimilate for 
unexperienced people. 
2.2.2 Reciprocal culture model 
This model describes the interactions between factors that shape culture and is based on behaviour 
theory. Several scholars developed this model, Bandura used it to explain behaviour and Cooper 
applied it to provoke change of behaviour (Cole K. S., 2013). 
Three factors can be distinguished, even if the terminology might change depending on the author: 
- The person: it includes all psychological aspects and the individual perceptions (=climate). 
- The behaviour: it refers to the attitudes of people within the organization. 
- The environment: it is related to the context the organization is going through. 
The figure 3 represents the different interactions between each of these factors. It is important to 
notice that although interactions are reciprocal, they are not meant to be equal but vary on time and 
circumstances. 
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Figure 3 Schematic representation of reciprocal culture model 
As an example, we can represent the system as a schoolchild misbehaving at school. His misbehaving 
(behaviour related) influences the teachers and schoolmates (the environment) which will apply 
constraints on this schoolboy (punishment, bad grades, etc.). These constraints will influence the 
schoolboy’s perceptions of school (person/individual).  These perceptions, probably negative, will 
influence the boy’s behaviour. 
This example illustrates the factors of the model but does not includes reciprocity of interactions.  
It is important to note that, despite its psychological aspect, this model has been largely concretely 
applied, as 56% of publications are related to Applied Health Psychology (addiction, prevention, etc.), 
20% to Education, 16% to Business and only 2% to pure psychology according to an unofficial 
November 2013 Google Scholar search. (Social Cognitive Theory, 2017) 
Regarding safety aspects, we can assimilate the psychological factor (person) to the safety climate, 
which can be assessed through surveys. Environment refers to the safety management system, 
assessed with external audits. Behaviour is directly the safety behaviour (R. M. Choudry, 2007).  
 
This model is presented to exhibit the different factors responsible for the evolution of safety culture 
and their interactions. Yet, this model also necessitates a strong background in human sciences, 
particularly psychology.  
2.2.3 Reason model 
2.2.3.1 Westrum’s model 
Reason’s model is based on a model developed by Westrum in 1984 that assesses the range of interest 
of organizational culture (personal interest, department interest, global interest) regarding 
information flow and leadership (Fleming, 2006). 
Westrum defined these three level, as “Pathological”, “Bureaucratic” and “Generative”.  Table 2 shows 
the different considerations of information according to the level of organizational culture as an 
example. This can be generalized for several dimensions of culture (responsibility, reaction to failure, 
etc.) 
Table 2 Example : Information considerations according to Parker, 2006 
Westrum’s level Pathological Bureaucratic Generative 
Information is… Hidden Ignored  
(if not interesting) 
sought 
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2.2.3.2 Reason’s model 
In 1993 Reason adapted Westrum’s model by including two typologies, reactive and proactive, in 
order to able users of the model to do an in depth assessment (Parker D., 2006).  According to Parker, 
the five typologies can be condensed with the following statements: 
Pathological: Who cares about safety as long we don’t get caught? 
Reactive: Safety is important; we do a lot every time we have an accident. 
Calculative: We have systems in place to manage all hazards. 
Proactive: We try to anticipate safety problems before they arise. 
Generative: HSE is how we do business round here. 
These typologies reflect the maturity of safety culture within an organization, pathological and 
generative being respectively the less and the more mature typology.  
 
Figure 4 Safety Culture Maturity Model according to Reason 
 
2.2.3.3 Parker’s framework 
Based on the safety culture maturity model of reason, Parker, Lawrie and Hudson developed a 
framework of several dimensions characterized for each level in oil and gas industries. They conducted 
interviews of executives of different companies to investigate eleven concrete and seven abstract 
dimensions of safety culture which are described for every level (Fleming, 2006). This framework is 
available in appendix A .  
This framework is included in the “Hearts and Minds Program” (H&M) developed by Shell to provide 
solution to improve safety culture (Energy Institute, 2017). It is the basis of the “Understanding your 
culture” brochure, one of the tool provided in this kit. 
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This model is well documented and several tools have already been developed, facilitating its 
implementation and use. The proposed scale is also quite clear and terminology do not require 
particular theoretical background.  
2.2.4 DuPont Bradley Curve 
In the 90’s, DuPont committee board wanted to investigate the differences of safety performance 
between their plants and performed on-site investigations all around the world. Firstly, they claim 
they demonstrated the correlation between safety, productivity and profitability (DuPont, 2015).  
Secondly, they developed a model of safety culture known as the DuPont Bradley curve. This curve 
illustrates a decrease of accident rate when reaching a high level of safety culture (Figure 5). The 
thoughts behind the curve is the direct influence of leadership on workers’ commitment to safety 
through values, attitudes and beliefs. 
 
Figure 5 DuPont Bradley Curve (DuPont, 2015) 
 
The curve presents four typologies: 
Reactive: Compliance to laws and regulations is the goal. 
Dependent: Safety is enforced through supervisor control. 
Independent: Personal value and care-of-self ensure safety for the individual. 
Interdependent: Safety concerns the whole team and is an organizational pride. 
 
This model is presented due to its notoriety and reputation. The typologies are quite clear and 
understandable, but the documentation about theory and scientific approach is extremely poor 
(“black-box” model). This lack of documentation will be the main reason for the dismiss of this model. 
2.2.5 Safety Culture by Daniellou, Simard and Boissières 
The “Fondation pour une Culture de Sécurité Industrielle” (FONCSI) is a French foundation with the 
goal of helping industrial companies to improve safety. It has financed a project on the human and 
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organizational factors of industrial safety. Safety culture takes an important part of this work and the 
point of view of the authors is briefly presented here. (FonCSI, 2010)  
 
 
Figure 6 Safety culture and effects according to Daniellou, Simard and Boissières (FONCSI, 2010) 
 
The authors described the safety culture as “the set of developed and rehearsed practices by major 
concerned stakeholders to manage risks of their profession”. The focus is on the identification of the 
conditions of positive contribution of operators and collectives to safety. 
The authors consider two groups which are mainly concerned by safety: the management and the 
employees. 
Considering these two main stakeholders and the fact that safety culture is built by collective, the 
authors assess safety culture within four typologies, reflecting the respective involvement of both the 
Management and the Employees. 
 
Figure 7 Safety Culture typologies according to Daniellou, Simard and Boissières (FONCSI, 2010) 
Fatalistic culture: In this typology, both the employees and management are poorly concerned by 
safety issues and think “accidents happen”. People then tend to do nothing to avoid accidents as they 
will happen anyway.  
Job culture: This typology concerns a strong involvement of employees but not of management. It 
reflects a culture in which employees developed techniques to work safely on their own. These 
practices are generally informal and orally transmitted to new workers.  
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Managerial culture: This culture appears when management are strongly involved in prevention of 
accidents through rules and norms. Employees’ responsibility is then limited to the strict applications 
of recommendations and rules regarding safety. 
Integrated culture: In this typology both employees and management are involved. Management’s 
leadership is directive (top-to-bottom approach) and emphasize the importance of safety. However, 
employees have an important role as they bring their knowledge of terrain and are listened by 
management as valuable contributors to safety (participative leadership, bottom-to-top approach). 
 
This model is particularly interesting for its “2D-approach” for the evaluation of safety culture. As 
discussed earlier, leadership is one of the most important factor to foster safety culture development, 
but academia organization regarding leadership is quite complicated. The concept of a job culture 
could provide reflection track to slightly diminish importance of leadership (without neglecting it!). 
 
2.2.6 EPFL application – choice of a model 
Several existing models have been presented and discussed. As they all differ regarding their 
considerations and approaches, it is important to select the one that might apply as efficiently and 
easily to EPFL organization as possible. The scoring board below presents the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of these models regarding different criteria.  
Table 3 Scoring board comparing of the different safety culture model for application in academia 
 
IAEA Reciprocal Reason 
DuPont 
Bradley 
Daniellou 
Easy to use ++ - ++ - + 
Documentation ++ - + - + 
Influence of 
leadership 
-- + -- - ++ 
Identification 
of problems 
+ ++ ++ + -- 
Total score 3 1 3 -2 2 
 
Easy to use: This concerns the theoretical needed to understand and communicate this model through 
EPFL community. For instance, it might be inconvenient to make EPFL community adopt a too complex 
model.  
Documentation: The available information of the models is assessed, ad it is important to have as 
many information as possible to apply correctly the provided tools and to understand them. 
Influence of leadership: as discussed, leadership is a main aspect of safety culture. However, the 
“fiefdoms” organization in academia, as discussed above, is a strong barrier to effective leadership 
regarding safety by a centralized service of EPFL. We look here at the importance given to other factors 
as discussed in the Daniellou model’s part. 
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Identification of problems: The aim of this work is to provide information of safety culture within the 
laboratories of EPFL, but also to provide the tools, or at least identification of improvement 
opportunities. Here is assessed the identification of problems provided by the models and the tools 
given (or not) to correct them.  
 
According to the four criteria of the score board, it appears that both IAEA and Reason’s models can 
be suitable to EPFL organization. However, IAEA model includes three stages and evolution between 
these stages can take an important time. Thus I chose Reason’s model as it seemed important to have 
a model that display a relatively quick evolution to avoid discouraging the concerned workers. 
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3 Method 
It has been decided to assess safety climate within EPFL academic laboratories as the initial step of 
safety culture improvement. Regarding the corresponding literature, it is accepted that safety climate 
can be assessed through surveys. This method allows to gather a lot of data with a reasonable 
workload and short time.  
3.1 Objectives 
The following objectives have been expressed: 
- The survey should determine if the chosen model is suitable for an application at EFPL. 
- The survey should provide an overview of safety climate of the academic research units of 
EPFL. 
- The survey should identify strengths and improvement opportunities. 
 
3.2 Model 
According to the scoring board in the previous part the model of Reason is chosen as the evaluation 
scale, and Parker’s framework will be used as a basis to develop the survey.  
The “Hearts & Minds Toolkit – Understanding your culture” brochure, based on the same model, 
suggests to select relevant dimensions (approx. 9) regarding the activities of the target audience and 
the supervision/management aspects. In this case as the objectives are addressed to workforce level, 
the selection will be based on the perceptions of the lab-workers, it means they need to be involved 
in the corresponding processes.  Detailed are provided in part 3.3.3.1. “Applicable dimensions’ 
identification”. 
This toolkit also has been recognized as having a pragmatic approach of culture assessment (L. 
Eckelaert, 2011) and focuses on the evolution rather than descriptive anthropological or psychological 
aspects. Thus it is expected to provide a good support for safety culture improvement at EPFL 
regarding a long-term approach. 
3.3 Method of data collection 
Several methods have been discussed in order to find the better compromise between the number of 
respondents, the scientific validity and reliability. It is also important to be able to collect valuable 
information to provide information to the SCC.  
- Number of respondents: Many surveys are distributed to EPFL community, especially near the 
end of the semester. Moreover, contrary to several companies, survey completion will not be 
accounted as work-time, so the survey need to be as short and fast to complete as possible. 
- Scientific validity and reliability: It is universally recognized that surveys are very sensitive to 
personal interpretation and subjective bias (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002, pp. 
22-39). Therefore, it has been decided to adapt an existing and reviewed safety climate 
assessment tool rather than to create entirely a survey which might be quite questionable. 
- Valuable information: Despite the information about the applicability of the model and safety 
climate, it is expected to get situational analysis through this survey (for instance, does people 
systematically report accident?). This should provide reflection path for the Safety 
Competence Center to fulfill their mission regarding the safety at EPFL. 
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3.3.1 Dismissed method 
This part focus on the methods that have been considered to develop the survey but were rejected. 
3.3.1.1 Likert scale 
Likert scale is very common in surveys. Such surveys ask the respondents to indicate their agreement 
level to sentences, generally on a five or seven points scale as presented below. 
Table 4 Example of Likert-scale with five points and non-forced choice 
Strongly 
disagree 
/ Disagree / 
Neither agree 
or disagree 
/ Agree / 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Regarding the IAEA recommendations (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002, pp. 37-38), it was 
planned to develop at least four questions by dimensions to ensure good coverage of the dimension.  
This method provides a simple and quick survey, but we noticed that assessment of safety climate 
regarding Reason’s model would be complicated as it was nearly impossible to state questions for 
which each of the five Likert point will correspond to one of the five typology of the model. 
For instance, the dimension “accident and incident reporting, investigation and analysis” could not be 
assessed through a Likert-type question as the three best typologies (calculative, proactive and 
generative) include a systematic reporting of accidents. Thus it is impossible to differentiate these 
three typologies if a respondent strongly agrees with “I report systematically accidents”.  
It has been proposed to develop several questions in order to match every typology with a certain 
pattern of answer, but this seemed very empirical and we preferred to apply a validated method. 
Thus, this method was dismissed.  
About thirty questions have been developed regarding the selected dimensions of Parker’s 
framework, they are presented in appendix B for informational purpose and potential future use. 
 
3.3.1.2 Simple sentence selection 
Following the conclusions of the Likert-scale questionnaire, a second method was developed to apply 
more faithfully “H&M” method. 
It was proposed to have respondents choosing, for each dimension, the typology’s description that 
suit the best his perceptions of safety within his laboratory.   
In order to keep a quickly filled survey, the descriptions of the typologies have been summarized in 
short and simple sentences. This summary is available in appendix C. 
However, it has been noticed that we might lose some of core information of the original framework 
and this method was dismissed for the benefit of the one presented below.  
3.3.2 Chosen Method 
Finally, it was decided to apply the “Hearts and Minds Toolkit – Understanding your culture” scoring 
sheet based on Parker’s framework. As for the previous dismissed method, respondents will have to 
choose the most suitable typology for each dimension, but in this case the descriptions will not be 
simplified. Also in “H&M” program, respondents have to choose the description representing their 
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perceptions knowing the related typology (pathological, reactive, etc.). In this case these would not 
be displayed to avoid positive or negative bias1. 
Unfortunately, this method seems quite time-consuming and it is expected to have less respondents 
willing to fulfill the survey, over it is assumed the answers will be more reliable. 
Also, to improve understanding of lab-workers, the framework has to be adapted to fit the 
terminology and structure of EPFL. This adaptation is presented in part 3.3.3.2 “Adaptation of selected 
dimensions for EPFL application”. 
3.3.3 Parker’s Framework and Hearts and Minds Program 
Parker and al. developed a framework regarding organizational safety culture by interviewing senior 
oil and gas company executives. This framework includes the key features of safety identified in 
literature (Parker D., 2006) distributed between two categories : concrete and abstract organizational 
aspects.  
These features, or dimensions, have been described by the interviewees at each of the five levels of 
Reason’s model. 
 
Shell’s Hearts and Minds program, which is intended to help organizations to improve their HSE 
performance (Energy Institute, 2017), used this framework to develop part of a toolkit to understand 
safety culture within a company.  
The first part of this toolkit is the understanding of its own safety culture (following parts will not be 
discussed as they treat about safety culture improvement). This program proposes to evaluate its 
safety culture regarding the developed framework during group discussion. Basically, a score sheet 
has to be filled during the group discussion to assess the level of the company for each applicable 
dimension. The average HSE Culture Score is the weighted mean, assuming the weights of the levels 
increasing from one (pathological) to five (generative).  
The term applicable has its own importance as its exhibits the fact that all dimensions of the 
framework are not necessary relevant depending on the company and the organizational level of the 
respondents group. The first step to adapt the framework to EPFL organization will then be to identify 
the applicable dimension depending on the target audience. 
 
The framework also has been developed with oil and gas company executive only. Thus it is admitted 
that the given descriptions are specific to industrial organizations, in particular to oil and gas 
industries. The second step will be to adapt the framework regarding the EPFL organization (hierarchy, 
terminology, accountability, etc.) 
 
3.3.3.1 Applicable dimensions identification 
The following part summarizes the criteria that resulted in the selection of eight dimensions and the 
creation of a supplementary dimension. The selected dimensions are displayed first with a short 
                                                          
1 Tendency to provide “socially acceptable answers” which do not reflect the truth, (International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 2002) 
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description and the reasons it appears they are relevant. Omitted dimensions are listed below in the 
same manner.  
Reminder: the target audience is the lab-workers mainly working in a laboratory at EPFL (which are 
mainly PhD students). 
Selected dimensions 
This part presents only the selection of appropriate dimensions.  
- Incident and accident reporting, investigation and analysis:  
This dimension relates to the obligation to report every incident to the Safety Competence Center 
(SCC) and the investigation’s depth following the report.  
 Lab-workers are concerned with this dimension as workers are supposed to report themselves the 
incident (to their manager or SCC directly). Investigation and analysis aspects are assessed too to 
evaluate the perceptions that lab-workers have of the analysis performed by SCC. 
- Work planning including Permit-to-Work, Journey management: 
Permits-to-Work are a systematic hazard analysis performed before working, thus this dimension is 
about safety consideration as well in planning establishment and overall planning.   
Lab-workers spend more of their time performing experiments so it is assumed they will feel 
concerned with this dimension and the involvement of their professor within the process, i.e., are the 
good questions asked regarding safety?  
- Competency/training – Are Workers interested? 
Continuous improvement goes through acquiring new skills, safety skills included. This dimension 
looks at the training process and the willingness of the workers to follow safety training. 
Basic safety training is mandatory at EPFL to work in a laboratory so lab-workers are forced to be 
concerned with this aspect. Further training sessions are proposed to so the interest of respondents 
to non-mandatory training sessions will be assessed to. 
- Who checks safety on a day-to-day basis? 
This dimension assesses who checks safety and the consideration given to the safety within the unit.  
This dimension will help assessing if lab-workers tend to be involved in safety surveillance process or 
if they tend to let the “person in charge” take care of safety alone.  
Safety coordinators (CoSec) involvement has been considered in this dimension but it has been 
decided to avoid the maximum of modifications of the original framework. Thus a new dimension was 
created to evaluate CoSecs’ position and influence.  
- Who causes the accident in the eyes of professors? 
The reaction of the management regarding the workforce is important. It is assumed that in a strong 
safety culture people knows accidents are a chain of events and rarely the consequences of one unique 
mistake. Root causes need to be identified at the organizational level to ensure improvement and 
adequate corrective measures. 
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Obviously, to fully assess this dimension involvement of professors is necessary. Thus, in this work one 
is interested by the perceptions of the workforce and the underlying question is “According to your 
personal opinion, where are root causes of accidents in the eyes of your professor?”.  
- How do safety meetings feel? 
This dimension concerns the present atmosphere during safety discussions and their purpose 
(blaming, reminder of rules, anticipation of problems, etc.).  For instance, a pathological safety culture 
will be reflected by conflicts and unwillingness to participate to safety discussions, whereas in a 
generative safety culture, discussions will be more spontaneous (called by anyone) and tend to 
anticipate problem before they arise.  
This dimension will be included in the survey to assess the feeling of lab-workers about safety 
discussions. Contrarily to most industries, there is no meetings fully dedicated to safety at EPFL and it 
is assumed that safety would be addressed in group meetings, if addressed. 
- Balance between HSE and profitability 
This dimension assesses the relative priority between safety and operations. According to the 
framework, a pathological organization will focus on profitability and consider safety as a loss of 
money only. A generative organization will consider that a good safety performance is a prerequisite 
to profitability.  DuPont claim they demonstrated the correlation between safety and profitability and 
used it as a basis for the development of their own model (DuPont, 2015). 
At EPFL, profitability is replaced by research performance but the idea remains. We want to know if 
lab-workers are willing to stop an experiment, risking the loss of an expensive product, for instance if 
safety appears to be compromised.  
- Commitment level of workforce and level of care for colleagues? 
The point of interest is the perimeter of safety considerations in people’s mind. Is safety just a way to 
avoid being reprimanded? Or is it driven by personal interest and survival instinct? Is it an issue that 
concerns the group as everyone is aware of its responsibility regarding the laboratory? 
It seems appropriate to include this dimension in the survey as laboratories are shared workplace 
gathering several persons. This seems important to evaluate this as laboratories are often crowded 
places. 
- Position and influence of CoSecs? 
This dimension is not included in Parker framework but was created to evaluate the perceptions of 
safety coordinators nominated in every EPFL research unit. The expected behaviors corresponding to 
the level of maturity have been defined regarding the mission of safety coordinators and the 
tendencies of other dimensions.  
The detailed description of this dimension is given in the below part regarding the adaptation of the 
framework for EPFL application. 
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Dismissed dimensions 
This part presents the justification of the dismissing of remaining dimensions. 
- Benchmarking, Trend and Statistics  
It is assumed this dimension would professor responsibility and probably not perceptible by lab-
workers. 
- Audits and reviews 
This process involves the professor, the CoSec and the SCC. Lab-workers’ involvement is reduced. 
- Hazard and unsafe acts reports 
We supposed this dimension very close to incidents and accidents reporting and lab-workers may not 
clearly distinguish unsafe acts and incidents. 
- Contractor management 
The infrastructure department (DII) is a main stakeholder as it coordinates requests for works and 
they may have no interactions with lab-workers. 
- Work-site job safety techniques 
Due to the heterogeneous activities within academic institutions, it is assumed that hazard analysis 
would require tremendous workforce (J-L. Marendaz, 2013). Thus, this dimension might be assessed, 
taking in account the method of hazard identification developed at EPFL (Marendaz, Friedrich, & 
Meyer, 2011).  
- What is the size/status of HSE department? 
This dimension assessment should be performed through external audit of SCC. 
- What are the rewards of good safety performance? 
It seemed unclear if this dimension should apply at the laboratory level or individual level. The former 
would be assessed through external audit, the latter seemed to be barely widespread within EPFL.  
- What happens after an accident? If the feedback loop closed? 
This dimension assessment should be performed through external audit of SCC. 
- Is management interested in communicating HSE issues with the workforce?  
This dimension could be assessed through external of SCC and/or with personal interviews of 
professors to discuss the interest and motivations of HSE communication. 
- What is the purpose of procedures?  
This dimension assessment should be performed through external audit of SCC. 
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3.3.3.2 Adaptation of selected dimensions for EPFL application 
Parker’s framework has been developed in oil and gas industry and therefore the organizational 
considerations are very specific and may be inapplicable to an academic institution.  
Moreover, most of laboratory members probably never worked in industry, especially PhD students 
that generally begin their thesis shortly after their graduation. Terminology has to be adapted to 
correspond to the usual terms to ensure a good understanding of statements. 
As discussed above, major differences between academia and industry lie in the hierarchical 
organization and the goal. Terminology can also be a source of misunderstanding between these two 
environments.  
The dimensions have been adapted according to these assumptions and are presented below. 
 In order to simplify the reading, the systematic changes have been listed. 
Systematic changes 
Table 5 summarizes the systematic changes that have been made to the framework to correspond to 
EPFL organization.   
Table 5 Systematic terminology changes of Parker's framework 
Parker’s Framework EPFL adaptation 
Management/Supervision Professor 
Workforce/Worker/Employee Lab-worker 
HSE Safety 
Company2 Laboratory 
 
Management/Supervision: The clear top-to-bottom path of leadership and responsibility in industrial 
companies ensure that the management of a unit is accountable of both safety and production.  At 
EPFL this top-to-bottom leadership does not exist and the term professor was chosen to represent the 
person in charge of a unit to avoid a misunderstanding between the professor’s and the Safety 
Competence Center’s responsibility. 
 
Workforce/Worker/Employee: The terms lab-worker was preferred to emphasize the audience 
targeting on people who mainly manipulate in a laboratory. As the term workforce referred to the 
operational level, it seemed important to clarify that the decisional and strategic levels (Professor and 
Head of Institutes) were not concerned.  
 
HSE: As this acronym is never used at EPFL, we doubted that everyone would know what it referred 
to.  
 
Company: As discussed earlier, culture (and therefore climate) is a construct common to a group of 
people, often discussed at the company level. At EPFL, each research unit can be seen as a distinct 
                                                          
2 This change is exceptionally different in the dimension “How do safety meetings feel?”, in the proactive 
typology. 
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company in the meaning that this unit has its own goals and objectives. In the same way that different 
companies may share an industrial plant with several common rules regarding common process 
(safety, energy, waste management, etc.), EPFL infrastructure is shared between laboratories and 
research units. Yet it is expected that culture would develop within a research unit. 
Specific changes 
This part summarizes the adaptation of each dimension to be as close as possible of EPFL organization. 
Systematic changes and unaltered dimensions are not mentioned.  
- Incident and accident reporting, investigation and analysis: 
The only punctual change occurs in the description of proactive behaviour. It stipulates reports are 
sent companywide, referring to department having different activities than the one declaring the 
incident. At EPFL as activities vary from a laboratory to another the term companywide has been 
replaced by whole EPFL campus. 
- Work planning including Permit-to-Work, Journey management: 
As this dimension refers to the safety considerations in operational business, it has been renamed 
Experiment planning, safety, Lab-management as laboratory manipulations and experiments are the 
operational business. The term permit-to-Work in the calculative description has been dismissed as 
this practice is not applied at EPFL.  
- Who checks safety on a day-to-day basis? 
In reactive description, external inspectors are replaced by Safety Competence Center as this is the 
service in charge of laboratory audits and the point of contact for safety matter.  
In calculative description the sites have been replaced by laboratories as the perceptions of lab-
workers are relevant within their laboratory. 
In proactive description, the stakeholders of cross-audits have been listed with professors replacing 
the managers and supervisors. Cosecs and lab-workers are added, the former due to their position in 
term of safety coordination, the latter for their importance in laboratory activities. 
- How do safety meetings feel? 
It has been assumed that no unit has meeting specifically oriented to safety but would prefer to 
integrate safety within existing group meeting. Thus the dimension was modified as “Importance of 
safety in group meeting?”.  
In the proactive typology of Parker’s framework, these meetings are described as “genuine forum for 
interaction across the company”. Exceptionally the term “company” has been changed to “laboratory” 
as group meeting are limited to unit research members and it seemed utopic to expect safety to be 
discussed across units on a regular basis.   
- Balance between HSE and profitability 
It is considered that profitability is not the main concern of a laboratory in terms of money, but the 
importance is rather placed in research performance (publications, patents, etc.). This dimension is 
changed regarding this consideration. 
A time-related behavior is added to the pathological typology to diminishes the focus on money on 
the original framework. Also it seemed coherent to add this consideration as certain experiment might 
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take a long time to be performed and the thought “If I stop now I lose my whole week of work” might 
appear.  
- Position and influence of CoSecs? 
This new dimension has been described in order to assess the perception that lab-workers have of the 
position and role of CoSecs within their unit. Efforts were made to be as consistent as possible for 
each level and to represent as faithfully as possible the tendency of the original framework. 
Pathological: For this level it was assumed that the members of the laboratory would not see the 
purpose of having a safety coordinator except fulfilling EPFL policy.  
Reactive: In a reactive laboratory, CoSec will have importance once a problem occurred and will be 
expected to help find corrective measure.  
Calculative: Cosec will be in charge of ensuring the laboratory “follows the rules” as this typology is 
driven by the trust in the system as a protection. 
Proactive: Laboratories with proactive behavior will tend to use Cosec’s training and skills to anticipate 
problems and find preventive measures. 
Generative: As every member of a generative laboratory will participate to safety tasks, the Cosec will 
be “only” the interface between the unit and the Safety Competence Center and might give a technical 
support if needed.  
The complete adapted framework is available in appendix D. 
 
3.4 Technical construction of survey 
This part summarizes the special considerations factored in. These considerations aimed at 
compliance to IAEA recommendations, practical aspects and data treatment. 
Support 
For practical reasons for diffusing and collecting data, a web tool designed for surveys has been 
chosen.  This platform ensured confidentiality regarding EPFL policy as it belongs to EPFL web domain. 
It also permitted to limit access to EPFL mail address owners and allowing them to answer only once.  
 
Dimensions sequencing 
In order to facilitate the concentration of the respondents and prevent them to interrupt the 
completion of the survey, the sequence of the dimensions was considered important. We imagined 
the path of a new arrival in a lab, with emphasize of the methods of work in the first place, following 
by the integration of the new-member in the lab, and then the reaction to accidents. This story-telling 
approach is expected to keep the attention of the respondent to his maximum and therefore 
increasing validity of the answers. 
 
Typologies ranking 
IAEA mentions the fact that employees “may be keen to give the “right” answer” and “will instinctively 
seek what they believe to be the “socially acceptable” response” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 
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2002). In order to limit this, we will randomly rank the question for each dimension. However, the 
order will remain identical for every respondent, allowing possible to analyze data for “speeding”, i.e. 
people who answers without actually reading the questions (checking every time the first box for 
instance).  
 
The questionnaire is displayed in appendix H. 
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4 Results 
Before publishing the survey, a pilot phase was conducted in order to get previous feedback on the 
survey and preliminary remarks. The volunteers were also asked to give their opinion about the survey 
in order to improve it before running it at school level. 
The pilot phase was first performed within the Safety Competence Center and external HSE managers 
in industry. During the second part of pilot phase, the survey was diffused within willing research units. 
The units were asked to fulfill the survey, and, if relevant, a feedback of the results were proposed to 
the units to discuss their answers. 
4.1 Pilot phase 
4.1.1 Specialists feedback3 
The main feedback concerned the length of the sentences to be selected. Most of the respondents 
emphasized that long sentences might be daunting and it may discourage people from answering.  
Several uncertainties have been discussed concerning some dimensions, in particular the one 
concerning the incident and accident reporting. The relevance of a daily access to reported accidents 
was questioned, as well as the definition of an accident within academic organization which seemed 
to be quite unclear and not universal.  
It was also noticed that the distinction between some descriptions was tenuous and it might be 
difficult for non-HSE specialists to understand these differences. However, it was decided to preserved 
these tenuous differences.   
A particular attention will be given to the communication and the contextual explanations about the 
purposes of the survey and to insist and the importance for respondents to inquire their own 
perception rather than an estimation of overall perceptions of lab-members.  
 
4.1.2 Research units’ feedback 
Six professors accepted to diffuse the pilot survey within their unit. It was expected to reach a higher 
participation rate with a direct support of the professor in charge of the unit to assess validity of the 
survey. This is summarized in table 6. 
Table 6 Participation rates of research units of pilot phase 
Sample Participation rate 
Labo-1 17 % 
Labo-2 29 % 
Labo-3 40 % 
Labo-4 17 % 
Labo-5 0 % 
Labo-6 10 % 
 
Feedback session and discussion were not proposed to research units 1,2,5 and 6 due to the low 
participation rate or non-significant number of answers (labo-2). Due to a lack of time and interest, 
the feedback of labo-4 was not planned.  
                                                          
3 Based on email discussions. Available upon request. 
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A meeting with Labo-3 was planned to present the result of the unit and discuss it. A presentation of 
the theoretical background was displayed before the presentation of the results (see Appendix E). Lab-
members had the opportunity to intervene and react to the results. A summary of the meeting was 
sent to the professor.  
The results of the lab are presented below. The professor’s answers were segregated from the 
answers of lab-workers. The maturity of safety climate was determined as the mode of the data values 
for each assessed dimension. These values are indicative and not statistically relevant due to the low 
sample’s population. 
Table 7 Results of Labo-3 for each dimensions in percent (N=7) 
 Pathological Reactive Calculative Proactive Generative Labo. Prof. 
Planning 14.3% 14.3%  0.0% 42.9% Generative Calculative 
Balance 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 57.1% Generative Proactive 
Training 71.4% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% Pathological Generative 
Safety 
discussions 
14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 85.7% Generative Proactive 
Who checks 
safety 
42.9% 0.0% 14.3% 28.6% Pathological Calculative 
Commitment 
for 
colleagues 
0.0% 42.9% 0.0% 57.1% Generative Generative 
Who causes 
accidents 
0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 57.1% Generative Proactive 
Accidents 
reporting 
42.9% 28.6% 14.3% 14.3% Pathological Calculative 
CoSecs 28.6% 14.3% 28.6% 14.3% N/A Calculative 
 
The following issues were identified during the discussion:  
 Lack of context, resulting in misleading questions (ex. About individual responsibility 
regarding safety), 
 Some typologies, for certain dimensions, were not mutually exclusive and a ranking 
system might be needed rather than only checking one answer,4 
 Some questions may not make full sense in an academic environment. 
 
Due to the short schedule for this project, the survey was diffused to EPFL community before the 
discussion, therefore these issues were not corrected and will be subject to recommendations in 
corresponding part below for further investigations. 
It was highlighted that generally the respondents were not able to hierarchize the answers, i.e. 
determining which is the “best” or the “worst” answer, avoiding therefore a bias.  
We observed that this laboratory predominantly adopted a generative behavior (5/9 dimensions) 
regarding the assessed dimensions. As the responsible professor of this unit exhibited a strong interest 
                                                          
4 For instance, in the dimension Competence/Training, the pathological typology is to considered safety 
training as a necessary evil. Due to interpretation issues, it appeared that people might want to answer this 
one as there is mandatory safety training at EPFL. Thus in their minds it not necessarily excludes other 
typologies. 
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and motivation to participate to this experiment, it is not surprising that this laboratory exhibits a 
strong safety climate. This corroborates the idea that leadership highly influences safety culture.  
The three dimensions evaluated as pathological were safety accounting, accidents reporting and 
training. These scattered dimensions and their original formulation’s relevance in academic context 
could be questioned. Adaptation of the typologies should then be further adapted.   
Moreover, the dimension “Position and influence of CoSecs” displays no obvious tendency. As this is 
a new dimension specifically created for this survey, we can suppose that the described typologies are 
not as relevant and consistent as the original’s framework. 
 
4.2 Second phase  
The survey was diffused to EPFL community via e-mail. An email was sent to institutes to reach a 
maximum of lab-workers such as PhD students, technician, professor, scientific collaborator, 
administrative assistant, etc. The first message was sent on November 29th and a reminder was sent 
on January 4th. Institutes in which laboratory-work was supposed negligible were not concerned 
(Architecture, mathematics, informatics, communication system, etc.) 
A total of 4324 persons received the email. The survey was provided in both English and French.  
As no significant changes in the survey occurred after the pilot phase within laboratories, the 
corresponding answers were integrated to the global results of the survey. Pilot answers from the SCC 
and external specialists were not integrated.  
4.2.1 Summary 
The tables below summarize the collected data of the survey.  
Two answers have been deleted of the results due to invalidity (one duplicate entry and one 
respondent stipulated that he answered randomly for one question). 
Table 8 Repartition of respondents regarding the source of data collection 
Source Pop. [-] 
Pilot phase answers 18 
English version answers 48 
French version answers 19 
Total answers 85 
Participation rate 2.0% 
 
The participation rate is computed regarding the number of persons who received the email, the PhD 
students, professors, technician, administrative assistant, etc. Repartition of the respondents 
regarding schools is given in table 9. 
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Table 9 Repartition of respondents regarding their School 
School Pop. [-] 
SB 33 
SV 12 
STI 28 
ENAC 11 
IC 1 
Others 0 
 
Table 10 Repartition of respondents regarding their role 
Roles Pop. [-] 
PhD Students 38 
Postdoc 10 
Professor 5 
Technician 9 
Other 23 
The category “other” gathers master thesis students, interns, scientific collaborators, engineers and 
roles that was not proposed in the survey. Also three participants of the pilot phase have not informed 
about their roles due to a configuration issue of the survey at the time.  
Table 11 Repartition of respondents regarding their occupation within a laboratory 
“Is laboratory-work your main occupation?” Pop. [-] 
Yes 62 
No 20 
The same three participants of the pilot phase could not answer this question for the same reason. 
The three tables (9 to 11) above will be used to display results according to different criteria.  
Are you working in an academic laboratory at 
EPFL? 
Pop. [-] 
Yes 84 
No 1 
Table 12 Repartition of respondents concerning link to an academic laboratory of EPFL 
This table is used as a systematic criterion; every person answering “No” will be excluded of the 
results.  
Several sets of criteria will be used to aggregate information at different level and for different 
population. These sets are described in table 13 below. 
Table 13 Sets of criteria 
 Main Occupation School Roles 
Set 1 Yes All All 
Set 2 Y&N All PhD students 
Set 3 Y&N SB All 
Set 4 Y&N SV All 
Set 5 Y&N STI All 
Set 6 Y&N ENAC All 
Set 7  Y&N All All 
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4.2.2 Assessment of dimensions 
The results of the respondents who stated that they work in laboratories as their main occupation (set 
of criteria 1) are presented. This includes a major part of PhD students, but also the technicians, 
Postdoc, interns, etc.  
The results are displayed below for each dimension. They are summarized in a scoring table as well as 
the indicative HSE Score as defined in the “Hearts and Minds toolkit – Understanding your culture” 
brochure.  
It is important to remind that people who responded to the survey were all willing to. Therefore, we 
can assume they have an interest in safety so they might positively skew the results. 
Experiment Planning, Safety, lab-management 
 
Figure 8 Repartition of typologies for dimension 1 within lab-workers 
Regarding this result, we can assume that a majority of respondents (55%) grants importance to the 
planning of their experimentations and includes safety considerations into it (proactive and generative 
typologies).  
35% of respondents (pathological and reactive) indicated they focus on the execution of their 
experimentations, probably to fulfil professor requirements regarding the volume of data, and only 
time is considered (if considered!).  
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Balance between safety and research performance 
 
Figure 9 Repartition of typologies for dimension 2 within lab-workers 
It appears that a large majority (70%) of respondents do not consider safety as a barrier to research 
performance but can adapt to prevent or to correct deviation. No conflict between safety and research 
seems to be present for them, on contrary of the 16% of respondents who indicated a calculative 
typology. These lab-workers might have some difficulties to manage both safety and research but still 
have important consideration for the safety within their unit.  
Competence/training – are workers interested? 
 
Figure 10 Repartition of typologies for dimension 3 within lab-workers 
29% of respondents see safety training as a “necessary evil”, which indicates they only attend the 
session because it is compulsory. We can suppose these respondents are not satisfied with the content 
of the proposed safety training or do not consider safety training as relevant or important regarding 
their laboratory work. 
39 
 
On contrary, 37% of respondents consider needs are identified and they are part of the process. We 
can assume this occur at research units’ level during group discussions for example.   
It would be interesting to investigate a possible correlation within the perception of hazards within 
laboratories with the interest for safety training, as the lack of identified hazard might be a cause of 
lack of interest. 
Importance of safety in group meetings? 
 
Figure 11 Repartition of typologies for dimension 4 within lab-workers 
This result indicates that safety is not a taboo within research units and issues are discussed when 
noticed for 68% of respondents. This exhibits a relax atmosphere within the unit and we can assume 
blame is not an issue for them.  
On contrary, for 16% of the respondents it seems that conflict and blame are present during safety 
discussions. This atmosphere could be the source of hidden mistakes, provoking a loss of information. 
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Who checks safety on a day-to-day basis? 
 
Figure 12 Repartition of typologies for dimension 5 within lab-workers 
It appears that team spirit exists for at least 65% of the respondents as they seem to be conscious of 
the importance of their attention regarding safety for themselves as for others.  
22% of respondents indicated a pathological typology, as they think individual see fit to take care of 
themselves. This might indicate they think mistakes come from individual mistakes and therefore, if 
everyone works safe, everyone will be safe.  
Commitment level of workforce and level of care for colleagues? 
 
Figure 13 Repartition of typologies for dimension 6 within lab-workers 
39% of respondents exhibit a high level of commitment and care for colleagues and 19% indicated the 
development of pride within their unit, which indicates a well-developed team spirit and consideration 
for other people. 
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On the other hand, 23% of respondents indicated that commitment is dependent of safety 
performance as it diminishes after a period without incident.  
Another difference appears regarding the range of interest, as 31% of respondents (pathological + 
reactive) focus on the individual while 58% of respondents’ commitment is about the team. 
In your opinion, who causes accidents in the eyes of professor? 
 
Figure 14 Repartition of typologies for dimension 7 within lab-workers 
These results exhibit that 68% of lab-workers estimate professor feel responsible in case of accidents 
and blame is not an issue as problems as considered at a broad range.  
However, for the rest of the respondents it appears that they estimate that, for the professor, causes 
lie in individual.  
Incident and Accident reporting, investigation and analysis 
 
Figure 15 Repartition of typologies for dimension 8 within lab-workers 
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These results displays that a quarter (26%) of the respondents do not report systematically accidents 
and/or consider analysis are superficial and do not go beyond legal requirements.  
On contrary, 29% of respondents indicated accidents are systematically reported and consider 
investigations are driven by deeply understanding of the situation.   
These really divergent results indicate a strong difference of accident reporting within the different 
research units and the reason of such considerations could be further investigated.  
Influence and position of CoSecs 
 
Figure 16 Repartition of typologies for dimension 9 within lab-workers 
This result exhibit a scattering of the consideration of CoSec’s role within research units as the answers 
are quite equilibrated. However, it appears that CoSecs are principally seen as exceptional help to 
correct problems (34%).  
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Scoring table 
Table 14 recapitulates the numbers of answers for each typology, for each dimension. The score, 
calculated as the weighted mean, provides indications of the dimensions with a particular need of 
corrective measures and improvement.  
Table 14 Detailed results for set of criteria 1 
 Pathological Reactive Calculative Proactive Generative 
[1] Planning 10 12 6 17 17 
[2] Balance 4 5 10 16 27 
[3] Training 18 10 10 1 23 
[4] Safety 
discussions 
3 10 3 4 42 
[5] Who checks 
safety 
14 3 5 16 24 
[6] Commitment 
for colleagues 
5 14 7 12 24 
[7] Who causes 
accidents 
10 2 8 19 23 
[8] Accidents 
reporting 
16 14 7 7 18 
[9] CoSecs 9 21 13 13 6 
 
In table 15, the score has been calculated as the weighted mean considering assigned values to the 
different typologies, going from 1 to 5 for pathological to generative. 
The global HSE Score is the mean for dimensions 1 to 8, dimension 9 (CoSecs’ position) being dismissed 
as not originally included in the Parker’s framework.  
Table 15 Mean score for the 9 dimensions and their standard deviations 
 Mean Standard deviation 
[1] Planning 3.33 2.16 
[2] Balance 3.93 1.51 
[3] Training 3.05 2.88 
[4] Safety discussions 4.15 1.78 
[5] Who checks safety 3.56 2.51 
[6] Commitment for colleagues 3.60 1.98 
[7] Who causes accidents 3.68 1.99 
[8] Accidents reporting 2.95 2.53 
[9] Cosecs’ position and influence5 2.77 1.49 
Global HSE Score 3.53 0.42 
 
The dimension relating to the Cosecs’ position has not been integrated into the mean as it was very 
scattered and one preferred to keep the HSE Score as defined in the “Hearts and Minds toolkit – 
Understanding your culture” brochure. 
                                                          
5 This dimension is not included in the HSE score as it was not in the original framework. 
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4.2.2.1 Internal consistency 
The Cronbach’ alpha coefficient has been computed according to the formula: 
α =
k
k-1
 (1-
∑ σi
2k
i-1
σX
2 ) 
With k the number of items, σi2 the variance of item i, σX2 the variance of total score. (Bland & Altman, 
1997). 
Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of the internal consistency, or reliability, of a measure. It provides 
information about covariances of items. In the case of such a survey, a high alpha coefficient would 
mean that the questions would be correlated and probably measure the same underlying construct.   
Dimension about Cosecs still excluded, we obtained a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.75, which is 
considered as an acceptable value regarding the internal consistency of the survey.  
The interpretation below is based on the presented data and aims to provide assumptions explaining 
these results and the differences between dimensions.  
4.2.2.2 Working atmosphere [dimensions 1, 6 & 7] 
Regarding dimension 1 “Experiment planning, Safety, lab-management”, dimension 6 “commitment 
level of workforce and level of care for colleagues” and dimension 7 “Who causes accident in the eyes 
of professors?”, we can assume a majority of laboratories having a relax atmosphere in which people 
have a team-spirit (dimensions 6&7) and that the communication within the lab should be good 
enough to ensure a global planning process well-established (dimension 1) (for each of these 
dimensions, respectively 55%, 58% and 68% of respondents indicated a proactive or generative 
typology).   
We can say this comes from a strong leadership of professor toward a healthy atmosphere, limiting 
concurrency between PhD students for example, and proscribing rushing for the benefit of planning.  
 
On the other hand, the pathological typology (between 8 and 16%) may result from a competitive 
atmosphere, limiting the interaction of care of colleagues, and high requirements from the professor, 
resulting in the focus on the collection of a maximum of data, working late and during the week-ends, 
etc. 
 
4.2.2.3 Interest into safety [dimensions 2 ,4 & 8] 
Dimension 2 “balance between safety and research performance” and dimension 4 “importance of 
safety in group meetings?” show that a large majority of respondents (respectively 70% and 74%) 
indicated a proactive or generative typology. It means that safety issues are actually not ignored when 
identified, and safety is not a taboo for most of units. According to these results, people feel free to 
talk about safety and they integrate safety as an important aspect regarding their researches and 
work. 
However, dimension 8 “Incident and Accident reporting, investigation and analysis” shows that for 
almost half of respondents, accidents are not systematically reported (49% choose the pathological of 
reactive typology). Yet, incidents are a direct manifestations of safety issues and this lack of 
consideration of this aspect seems contradictory with the displayed behavior in dimensions 2 and 4.   
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Different hypothesis might explain this variance.  
The definition of accident is not universal: 
The definition of incident and accident might be not universal, as several reported they have never 
witnessed accidents within their laboratory. Yet, we can estimate that, in every lab, incidents occurred 
(broken glass, superficial scratches, contact with a hot surface, spill of a chemical, etc.). Thus these 
might be not perceived as accident. Also, reporting “minor” accidents, like superficial scratches, might 
be perceived as a loss of time. 
Unsatisfying feedback: 
We could assume that people do not report accident because of unsatisfying feedback and analysis. 
However, a non-negligible fraction of respondents affirmed investigations of accidents were deeply 
performed (29% indicated a generative typology) so this hypothesis is improbable. 
Sensitivity to organizational factors: 
We can suppose people are not sentient to the organizational factors and the importance of accidents 
analysis, even minor one, to prevent more severe accident and they only focus on past and present 
aspects of accidents but do not perceive the learning opportunities.  
Thus we can suppose that people are not refractory to safety, as we could have imagined, but need 
to be educated and trained to distinguish subtler safety aspects, in particular the organizational 
factors. 
 
4.2.2.4 Accountability [dimensions 1, 5 & 9] 
Dimension 1 “Experiment Planning, Safety and lab-management” and dimension 5 “Who checks safety 
on a day-to-day basis?” exhibit a delegation of accountability from the professor to the lab-members 
as laboratories generally present a well-developed team-work (65% of respondents indicated a 
proactive or generative typology for dimension 5) regarding as well safety checking as planning 
process.  
However, according to dimension 9 “Position and influence of CoSecs”, delegation and sharing of 
responsibility with CoSecs appear to be very scattered and the tendencies are very different from both 
previous dimensions. Causes of this scattering could come from two factors: 
Unconsistency of this dimension: 
First explanation could be the creation of this dimension was not consistent with original Parker’s 
framework. The new dimension has been described with short and simple sentences that might not 
include the subtleties of the position of CoSecs.  
Unclear definition of the role of CoSecs: 
Second explanation could the different expectations from the position of CoSecs in different research 
units. Some might consider CoSec as an administrative position, with the only responsibility to do the 
paperwork regarding safety regulations, or as an integral part of the process of prevention of accidents 
with the input of specific skills. 
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4.2.2.5 Adequacy between EPFL regulations and research units needs [dimensions 3, 8 & 9] 
These three dimensions displayed the lowest scores out of all dimensions, respectively 3.05, 2.95 and 
2.77. Another common factor is the involvement of EPFL, more specifically the SCC, as a stakeholder 
in these dimensions.  
Therefore, one can suggest there is a gap between the edicted rules from the SCC and their application 
within the laboratory. This can result from a lack of communication (for instance, the role of the 
CoSecs, or the existence of an accident reporting web platform), or unidentified needs from the units 
(proposed training sessions not specific enough). 
Further analysis could enlighten the underlying causes of this dichotomy and provide track of 
reflection in order to improve this situation.  
 
4.2.3 Summary of sets’ results 
The followings tables summarize results for different sets of criteria.  
Table 16 Summarized results for set of criteria 2 
Results for set #2 
Role School Main Occupation 
PhD students All Yes 
Population (N) 34 
HSE score 3.38 
Standard Deviation 0.32 
Population of table 16 above is the PhD students of all schools who indicated laboratory work is their 
main occupation.  
Tables 17 to 20 below summarize the results for different schools of EPFL. No filtering is done 
regarding role or laboratory work as main occupation. 
Basic Sciences School 
Table 17 Summarized results for set of criteria 3 
Results for set #3 
Role School Main Occupation 
All SB Y&N 
Population (N) 33 
HSE score 3.43 
Standard Deviation 0.48 
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Life Sciences School 
Table 18 Summarized results for set of criteria 4 
Results for set #4 
Role School Main Occupation 
All SV Y&N 
Population (N) 12 
HSE score 3.65 
Standard Deviation 0.52 
 
Engineering School 
Table 19 Summarized results for set of criteria 5 
Results for set #5 
Role School Main Occupation 
All STI Y&N 
Population (N) 28 
HSE score 3.50 
Standard Deviation 0.39 
 
Architecture, Civil and Environmental Engineering School 
Table 20 Summarized results for set of criteria 6 
Results for set #6 
Role School Main Occupation 
All ENAC Y&N 
Population (N) 11 
HSE score 3.56 
Standard Deviation 0.32 
 
Table 21 summarizes the results at EPF level, gathering all respondents.  
Table 21 Summarized results for set of criteria 7 
Results for set #7 
Role School Main Occupation 
All All Y&N 
Population (N) 84 
HSE score 3.51 
Standard Deviation 0.38 
 
For each set of criteria, dimensions have been ranked according to their own score. This would 
highlight strengths and weaknesses for each population, especially schools, in order to identify 
potential sources of learnings. For instance, we can notice that SV school (set 4) got a higher score for 
dimension 7 than STI school (set 5). Investigating the reasons of this difference might provide solutions 
for improving this dimension in STI school. Inversely, dimension 1 (“Planning”) could be improve at SV 
school thanks to the STI school methods.  
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Table 22 Dimensions ranking for each set of criteria 
 Set 1 Set 2  Set 3 Set 4  Set 5 Set 6 Set 7 
[1] Planning 6  (3.31) 6  (3.24) 6  (3.15) 7  (3.17) 3  (3.75) 7  (3.18) 6  (3.36) 
[2] Balance 2  (3.92) 2  (3.68) 2  (3.79) 3  (3.92) 2  (3.93) 3  (3.64) 2  (3.84) 
[3] Training 7  (3.02) 7  (3.00) 7  (3.12) 8  (2.83) 7  (3.07) 8  (3.18) 7  (3.06) 
[4] Safety discussions 1  (4.16) 1  (3.97) 1  (4.24) 2  (4.08) 1  (3.96) 1  (4.18) 1  (4.13) 
[5] Who checks safety 5  (3.53) 5  (3.35) 4  (3.42) 5  (3.50) 6  (3.25) 6  (3.45) 5  (3.39) 
[6] Commitment for colleagues 4  (3.58) 3  (3.41) 5  (3.39) 4  (3.83) 4  (3.68) 4  (3.55) 4  (3.59) 
[7] Who causes accidents 3  (3.69) 4  (3.35) 3  (3.64) 1  (4.42) 5  (3.46) 2  (3.73) 3  (3.71) 
[8] Accidents reporting 8  (2.95) 8  (3.03) 8  (2.67) 6  (3.42) 8  (2.93) 5  (3.55) 8  (3.00) 
[9] CoSecs 9  (2.77) 9  (2.62) 9  (2.52) 9  (2.58) 9  (2.93) 9  (2.73) 9  (2.71) 
 
Raw data are available in appendix F available upon request (attached file). 
4.2.4 Indicator “Cosecs’ Position and Influence” 
During the adaptation of the framework, we created the dimension related to the CoSecs’ position 
and influence within their labs. As this dimension was less dense as the others, it was suggested to 
use it at an indicator of safety climate within a unit to easily get information within the team through 
a unique question.  
To evaluate this potential indicator, we considered a success if the level of maturity chosen by a 
respondent in dimension 9 (CoSecs’ position) is equal to the weighted mean of dimension 1 to 8 for 
this respondent. For instance, if respondent A gets a score of 4.2 as the mean score of dimension 1 to 
8, success will be reached if respondent A selects the proactive typology for dimension 9. Otherwise 
it’s a failure.  
 
Computing this, success rate has been of 22%. This correspond approximatively to the expected 
success for a random selection, thus it is not relevant to use this dimension as indicator for now; two 
factors may explicate this. 
As discussed above, this dimension should be deepened to be more reliable regarding the rest of the 
framework; it is possible that after that it might be used as an indicator. 
Also, CoSecs position and influence are quite a sensitive question and the high failure rate can come 
from the not universal consideration of the role of CoSecs within units. 
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Objectives results 
We discuss here the results and completion of the objectives presented in part 3.1 “Objectives”. 
Determining if the chosen model is suitable for an application at EPFL 
This model did not exhibit major inconsistency during the pilot phase and the survey therefore we can 
keep this tool for further investigations. However, it was determined that it is important to adapt more 
deeply Parker’s framework to be closer to academia and EPFL mechanisms. Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient also presents an acceptable value of 0.75. This mean the survey is quite consistent but can 
be improved. 
Providing an overview of safety climate amongst academic laboratories of EPFL 
There were concerns regarding the number of answers, but it was sufficient to allow some 
interpretations. It permitted the extraction of some information, some confirming empirical thought 
(accident reporting for instance) or infirming them (level of care for colleagues for instance).  
Thus we should not forget the positive bias that might exist as people who take time to answer 
probably had an important interest for safety.  
Also, despite the participation rate higher than expected, it does not allow a representative 
interpretation of safety climate within academic research units. Recommendations are given below to 
propose a method to improve this participation rate as well to correct the positive bias and objectives 
of participation rate. 
Moreover, regarding the table 22 “ranking of dimensions for the different sets”, we can observe a 
different morphology for each school. Therefore, an overview at EPFL level might induce a loss of 
information about safety climate within these school.  
Identifying strengths and improvement opportunities 
The answers, particularly the remarks from the survey, highlighted several improvement opportunities 
that need to be deepened to define a proper process of improvement.  
Some dimensions exhibited strengths that are contradictory with common thought regarding safety 
at EPFL; for instance, the importance of safety during group meetings is representative of a relaxed 
atmosphere within research units. EPFL scholars appear to be not totally refractory to safety 
considerations.  
A more detailed list of recommendations is presented in part below. 
5.2 HSE scores 
We can notice global HSE scores for each set of criteria are very similar (mean 3.51, max deviation +/- 
0.14). However, ranking the dimensions for every set regarding their score exhibits a difference of 
strengths and improvement opportunities. For example, we can notice that SV school (set 4) highest 
dimension is “who causes the accidents in the eyes of the professor?”, which is the 5th dimension for 
STI school (set 5). Contrarily, STI school seems to have better implemented planning process than SV 
school (dimension 1).  
Regarding the results, it appears that the most recurring typology is generative. HSE score however 
indicated a mean typology balanced between calculative and proactive, with strengths and 
weaknesses varying between the schools.  
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Using HSE score as an indicator could therefore lead to a loss of information. For instance, two schools 
or institutes may have the same score but very different morphology regarding the strengths and 
weaknesses and improvement measures can therefore not be implemented in the same manner. 
A detailed analysis of this dimensional ranking may provide information regarding the improvement 
of certain dimensions. For instance, we can investigate the reason of such a high rank of accident 
reporting within SV school to identify a way to develop this in other schools.  
It is also important to keep in mind that due to the low participation rate, these values are strictly 
indicative. It would also be irrelevant to rank schools regarding their HSE score. Detailed information 
is given as recommendations. 
As discussed in recommendations below, this method need to be improved in order to be more 
accurate and provide in depth assessment of safety climate. Such indicators could only give 
information about the level of maturity of safety climate within EPFL, which ensues from underlying 
causes that need to be assessed as well to provide improvement pathway.  
5.3 Positive bias 
It has been remembered several times that a positive bias is suspected in these results due to the 
length of the survey. A drawing lot was organized to motivate lab-members to answer the survey. It is 
interesting to notice only half of the respondents registered for this drawing lot. I assume that the lab-
members who did not registered had a strong interest for safety in general and therefore strongly 
participate to this positive bias.  
On the other hand, it is complicated to discuss the bias within the second half of respondents who did 
registered. Either they had an interest for safety and took the opportunity, either they were motivated 
by this drawing lot. No conclusion can be drawn as it was impossible to connect the answers to the 
drawing lot participants.  
Regarding the reliability of the answers, it is assumed that people answered honestly and carefully. 
For each respondent, we checked simple pattern that might indicate a “speed-ticking” (for example if 
the respondent checked the first box for every answer). No answer was invalidated. 
However, many remarks (31 over a total of 58 remarks) have been made regarding the design of the 
survey, more specifically to the relevance and/or the clarity of certain propositions. These remarks 
emphasize the fact that this the described typologies are very specific and quite complicated to 
understand without theoretical background and explanation. Remarks are available in appendix G. 
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6 Recommendations 
Recommendations are developed according to two axes. First, we will discuss about the safety climate 
assessment and the improvement needed to be more significant and relevant in order to provide a 
more precise evaluation of safety climate within academic research units. Then some 
recommendations will concern the safety climate at EPFL, giving some improvement opportunities 
which ensue the output of the survey, the results regarding Parker’s framework, and diverse remarks 
of respondents. These recommendations are given as a direct interpretation of results of the survey 
regarding safety climate. 
6.1 Survey processing 
This survey is a preliminary study for an in depth safety culture assessment and improvement. 
Processing the survey highlighted several issues and improvement opportunities that need to be 
corrected to perform further investigations: 
- Parker’s framework: The original framework developed by Parker was directly translated to 
EPFL/academia terminology. It appears that some dimensions (accident reporting, who causes 
the accidents in the eyes of professors in particular) were not perceived as relevant for several 
respondents. It seems necessary to strengthen the framework with safety experts working in 
academia.  
 
- This consolidated framework can then be evaluated through group discussions. These 
discussions can provide more reliable answers as issues like the lack of context or 
misunderstanding can be solved. Groups discussions can also be an opportunity to validate a 
simpler survey as discussed in part 3.3.1. “Dismissed methods” (Likert-scale, simple 
sentences). 
 
- The assessment of safety climate at EPFL could be completed with diffusing a simpler survey 
that might provide a higher participation rate; assuming the length of question was the main 
issue regarding the motivation of people to answer. This could provide statistically relevant 
data at School level and perhaps at institute level.  
 
- Currently the Global HSE score is given at EPFL level. Relevance of this global score could be 
discussed as evaluation at School level exhibited different strengths and weaknesses 
depending on the school. HSE score at School level cannot actually be considered relevant due 
to the lack of respondent from a same School (~20 by school). A higher participation rate could 
allow monitoring at school level and maybe at institute level. 
 
- The collected answers can be discussed as positively biases and probably skewed, considering 
respondents as volunteer and interest for safety. It could be interesting to evaluate the 
importance of this bias through objective indicators. For instance, I proposed to compare the 
actual ratio of reported accident to the respondents who affirm every accident is reported 
within their unit. This has not been done as I have been told I would not have enough time. 
Statistical approach 
Relevance of the results has been discussed due to the low participation rate. For a first improvement, 
I would suggest to aim a minimum participation rate equivalent to a hundred answers for each school. 
This value is proposed as it is the minimum generally admitted for statistical models like exploratory 
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factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), principal component analysis (PCA), etc. 
(MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999) 
This minimum would permit to perform such statistical analysis and get solid information regarding 
the consistency of the results.  
Regarding the results of the survey for the different schools (table 17 to 20) and the ranking table 22, 
it appears that assessment of safety climate is more relevant at school level as we can observe 
different tendencies. Thus a participation rate target at EPFL level is not suggested as it might be 
irrelevant.  
 
During the literature phase of the project, statistical tools have been studied (exploratory factors 
analysis, Bayesian networks, principal components analysis, etc.) but have not been applied as the 
minimal number of answers ensuring statistic validity of the method was high (100+ of valid answers 
and 5 times the number of questions). Also the theoretical background, especially for Bayesian 
networks, is quite important. Developing a simpler survey might open the path to the application of 
strong statistical methods that might emphasize correlation and/or causality between items. 
 
In depth analysis of underlying causes 
Several assumptions have been proposed to explain certain observed tendencies and need to be 
tested. For some of them an opinion poll could be diffused, or added to the existing survey. This poll 
should be very specific as it needs to highlight specific information. For instance, regarding the 
accident reporting dimension, the following questions could be asked to exhibit the main refractory 
factor: 
- Have you been informed of the obligation to report every accident to SCC? 
- Have you been informed of the Event Manager for accident reporting? 
- Do you think reporting every accident, even minor ones, is a loss of time? 
- Etc. 
This secondary questionnaire would answer the “why do we have such a safety climate?” question. 
6.2 Safety climate at EPFL 
Interpretation of results and the diverse discussions which occurred during this project brought out 
several improvement opportunities. Reflection tracks corresponding to these opportunities are 
presented here.  
The following propositions are prioritized in two categories regarding their potential added value, 
importance and/or possibility of implementation.  
6.2.1 Primary improvement opportunities 
Accident reporting  
It is acknowledged that accident reporting is an important safety process, allowing identification of 
problems before severe deviation. The survey exhibited, and that was not surprising, a dichotomy 
between the theory (every accident should be reported) and the reality at EPFL (major accidents only 
are reported).  
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Several possible explanations to this behavior have been outlined but further specific assessment is 
needed. To design a potential solution for this problem, the questions below should be answered first: 
- Why do people not report every accident?  
This issues may come from diverse problematics; time needed for reporting (“I don’t want to take one 
hour to report a superficial scratch”), the fear to be ashamed (“I don’t want people to know I did this 
mistake”), the lack of feedback (“Why should I report accident if the feedback is non-
existing/insufficient/does not answer my interrogations?”) 
Concerning the latter example about feedback, a non-negligible fraction of respondents seems agree 
that analysis and investigation were satisfying (29% of proactive and generative typologies). If 
confirmed, this might tighten the field of research of the causes. 
- What feedback do people expect from accident reporting? 
In order to develop an efficient tool, it is important to define precisely the needs of every stakeholder; 
here the SCC (that is still in charge of safety) and the lab-workers. In this process, lab-workers are the 
main source of information; intervention teams can provide information when mobilized; and it is 
important to keep this source in the loop. If lab-workers tend to think reporting is pointless, they will 
stop reporting.  
- How should information be managed? 
Regarding the two main exposed problems (time needed for reporting and the shame) might be, at 
least partially, solved through information management level.  
The fear to be ashamed, if confirmed, might be induced to the impersonal and global range of actual 
system as the reporting is very centralized, and available for every EPFL-member. We can imagine a 
reporting at lower level (school or even institute) to create a more private sphere of information-
sharing. For example, people could see the accidents reported within their institute, while the SCC 
would have access to the global database.  
Regarding the time needed to report accident, we can imagine a tick-a-box system to inquire basic 
information about hazards involved (animals, glassware, chemical compounds, etc.) and the 
application of an algorithm that will determine if further information are needed. For instance, a 
projection of a diluted acidic solution would not require precise information, while a projection of HF 
solution would necessitate further investigation. 
 
However, this solution presents advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages:  
This would provide a gain of time for SCC in the analyze of accidents as investigation’s depth will 
depend on the accident itself. 
Moreover, the needed workload might seem more reasonable in the eyes of involved lab-workers, 
who might be therefore more willing and receptive to accident reporting.  
A statistical follow-up could also be implemented to highlight recurring “small” accidents to prevent 
aggravation.  
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Disadvantages: 
This solution would necessitate to prioritize accidents and therefore a loss of sight of “small” accidents 
is possible.  
It is globally recognized that major accidents are preceded by small accidents and, in industry, these 
small accidents are targeted to be suppress and it is assumed this would prevent major accidents.  
The proposed method would go reversely, as focus would be on the largest accidents and granted 
importance will decrease with the gravity of the accident. 
CoSecs 
It appears that the position of CoSecs is very heterogeneous within research units. It would be 
interesting to perform further research and analysis in order to understand these differences and the 
reasons leading to them.  
Once this will be understood, it might be possible to outline strengths of the role of CoSecs as 
perceived by professors and lab-members and to harmonize how CoSecs are seen. This might come 
through a communication campaign about added value of CoSecs, or by modifying the requirements 
specifications of this role. 
 
Alternatively, it might as well to be a solution to accept these differences of perceptions and accept 
that the CoSec’s responsibility should vary per research unit and they should respond to particular 
needs while ensuring minimal safety requirements. CoSecs training sessions could then be adapted to 
different profile of person and units. 
These profiles would differ by the relative position of the CoSecs regarding his two attachment units, 
the SCC and his unit. For instance, in a laboratory exhibiting a strong generative safety behavior where 
everyone is responsible for and participate to safety, the CoSec might be closer to the laboratory than 
the SCC, being only an interface and the contact between the two entities.  
However, in a strong pathological laboratory, CoSecs might be closer to the SCC than the lab by being 
more of a supervisor and being more directive to ensure compliance. This would require a CoSec with 
more influence and power than the profile describe above.  
Training 
According to this survey, lab-workers do not feel concerned by training sessions and acquiring new 
skills. After a discussion with supervisors of this project, it appears that this is effectively a shortage in 
the continuous formation program.  
However, as discussed in this beginning of this report, academia’s activities are particularly diverse 
and it will be complicated to identify and respond to the needs.  
A first identification of primary needs could be performed through an inquiry with EPFL laboratories 
to highlight the main recursive dangers to which lab-workers are exposed. This could be performed 
through another survey or during the audits of laboratories by the SCC for example.  
Nevertheless, according to Parker’s framework, employees should actively participate to the process. 
A participative platform could be a solution, based on the model of crowdfunding: For instance, if a 
lab-worker is interested for a specific training program external to EPFL, he might propose it on this 
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platform and EPFL would participate to the fees if a certain number of people register; although it 
might be utopic to expect a large group of people to be such participating.  
 
6.2.2 Secondary improvement opportunities 
PhD students Awareness 
It has been discussed that the lab-workers might be hardly receptive to the impact of organizational 
factors, and more generally to safety. As PhD students have an obligation to gain several ECTS credits, 
it might be interesting to propose a course of “safety management in laboratory” to stimulate interest 
of the main population of lab-workers for safety and to sensitize them. 
This course might incorporate an introduction to organizational factors, case studies of accident 
(UCLA, TexasTech, etc.) to browse through this wide topic.  
 
Relationship between safety and research performance 
Literature generally states that organizations with a poor safety culture prioritize performance and 
productivity over safety. However, DuPont demonstrated a strong correlation between strong safety 
culture and profitability (DuPont, 2015).  
It might be interesting to perform similar studies in academia to determine whether or not this 
behavior also exists in academia, and if it does it might be an important support to communicate and 
sensitize to the importance of safety.  
Basically, the number of scientific publications of a unit and the number of accidents within this lab 
could be compared. No relevant literature has been found about this topic in academia.  
This study could be extended to further factors as the working atmosphere, stress of the lab-workers, 
number of working hours, etc. 
 
6.2.3 Parker’s framework enhancement 
Climate assessment performed during this project was based on the framework developed by Parker 
and applied in the Hearts and Minds program. However, it is important to notice evaluated dimensions 
were selected regarding their perceptibility by lab-workers. Evaluation of the dismissed dimensions 
should also provide relevant information on EPFL safety climate but need to be assessed differently 
(audits, groups discussions, etc.).  
 
6.2.4 Leadership 
Proposed improvement opportunities focus on operational issues to improve existing practices who 
appeared to present deficiencies. Nevertheless, leadership is universally accepted as a main factor 
leading to a good safety culture but was not discussed during this project. Further investigations could 
provide reflection tracks to build up a strong leadership toward safety organizational factors.  
For instance, a student-empowered approach was suggested as a viable method to improve safety 
culture in academia. This method contrasts with the traditional “top-to-bottom” approach in industry 
by increasing students’ responsibility and involvement towards safety (Mcgarry K. A., 2013).  
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Moreover, Parker’s framework states that HSE responsibility should be “distributed throughout the 
company” and HSE department would be small but powerful (generative typology regarding the size 
of the HSE status) (Parker D., 2006). At EPFL, the SCC centralized the competencies regarding safety 
and part of these are delegated to safety coordinators (CoSecs) of each research units. A proposed 
solution might be the creation of a new hierarchical level at institute level. This would be in the same 
vein as Parker’s framework, but this need to be assessed regarding the possibilities (external 
regulations, laws, etc.) and the relevance of delegated competencies.  
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7 Conclusion 
This project was about safety culture improvement in academic laboratory at EPFL. As discussed in the 
first part of this report, safety culture is a complex construct. Thus an important part of this work was 
about safety culture literature to gather relevant information about the construct in order to provide 
the necessary knowledge to pursue this project.  
Before improving safety culture, it was necessary to get indicators, scale or any tool allowing to 
numerically evaluate and monitor evolution through time. Reason’s model was proven to be a suitable 
model for an application at EPFL. Parker’s framework, developed according to this model, also 
provides interesting and relevant information. However, this framework was developed in oil and gas 
industries, and further and deeper changes of the described typologies are necessary to reflect 
academia organization.  
 
Safety climate, the directly perceptible facet of safety culture, has been assessed through a survey 
diffused within EPFL community, especially PhD students. This survey provides interesting 
information, and we were able to extract reflection tracks for safety culture improvement.  
However, further investigations are necessary to ensure a complete overview of safety climate within 
EPFL. Moreover, due to the length of the survey and the fact that respondents were all willing to 
answer the survey, a strong bias is suspected; methods need to be developed to facilitate global and 
more objective assessment.  
Safety climate has been assessed with a “global HSE Score”, as defined in the “Hearts and Minds” 
program of Shell, however it actually cannot be considered representative of EPFL safety climate due 
to the positive bias discussed above and the low participation rate. It was also suggested to consider 
this score at School level or even institute level rather than EPFL. 
 
The survey permitted to identify several improvement opportunities of safety at EPFL. For instance, 
the reporting of accident can and should be improved. It is globally acknowledged that this is a key 
dimension of a strong safety culture as it may prevent severe accidents. Minor accidents are generally 
not reported at EPFL and changes could be induced through a different information management and 
a tool corresponding to the needs of research units’ members, that needs to be defined.  
The survey also exhibited an important gap between people regarding the role and the importance of 
CoSecs. As this part of the survey was not based on any proven method or frame, it is difficult to say 
where the problem stands. CoSecs being the first contact of laboratory to safety it might be important 
to develop and standardize their position through units.  
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9 Appendix 
Appendix A Parker’s framework 
 
 
The seven abstract organizational factors defined by Parker 
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The eleven concrete organizational factors defined by Parker.  
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Appendix B Likert questions developed regarding Parker’s framework 
The suggested scale was a five-point Likert scale with non-forced choice starting from Strongly 
disagree to strongly agree 
1. Incident reporting, investigations and analysis 
1.1. I think causal analysis of accidents should focus on workforce level. 
1.2. When a safety-related incident occurs elsewhere on campus, it is communicated to me with 
causal analysis. 
1.3. I have been told to report every incident, accident and near-miss to Safety Competence Center 
through the safety events manager. 
1.4. In my opinion, reporting every small incident may be superfluous. 
 
2. Hazard and unsafe acts reports 
2.1. If I accidentally do something unsafe, I share it with the group to prevent future incidents. 
2.2. Discussions about unsafe acts are done in an informal way.  
2.3. We talk about unsafe acts when it happens. 
2.4. The PI encourages the lab to report as much hazard situations as possible.  
2.5. If my colleague does something unsafe, I am not comfortable to point this out to discuss it.  
 
3. Work planning, PTW, journey management 
3.1. I have to inform my PI before I use dangerous substance (pyrophoric, extremely flammable, 
explosive). 
3.2. When a change occurs in my experiment (chemical, process, etc.) I assess safety issues that 
may arise. 
3.3. I am fully confident when I perform an experiment that have already been done several times 
in the lab. 
3.4. Discussions with my PI about new experiments systemically include safety aspects. 
 
4. Competency/Training – are workers interested?  
4.1. I willingly participate to safety training sessions to acquire new skills. 
4.2. A good safety training is sufficient for new workers to ensure good safety behaviors in the lab.  
4.3. My PI encourages lab workers to participate in training session. 
4.4. I would like to propose specific training session in matters I’m concerned with. 
 
5. Who checks safety on a day-to-day basis?  
5.1. I consider that working unsafely can be dangerous for my lab colleagues. 
5.2. In my lab, safety concerns are a legitimate reason to stop any experiment in progress, even if 
it might have impact on planning. 
5.3. In my lab, safety concerns are a legitimate reason to stop any experiment in progress, even if 
it might have impact on financial matters. 
5.4. Past accidents are the main reason that justify safety concerns. 
5.5. In our lab, we consider the CoSec as the responsible person in charge of safety daily business. 
5.6. In our lab the CoSec delegates tasks to lab workers.  
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6. Who causes the accidents in the eyes of management? 
6.1. I am afraid to be seen as responsible of an accident in the lab. 
6.2. In my opinion, most accident occur if people are disrespecting safety rules. 
6.3. Please indicate on the scale below the relative responsibility in case of an accident 
Individual involved  o  o  o  o  o   Professor 
6.4. In my lab, PI get involved for any incident in the lab, even small ones. 
6.5. My PI ensures maintenance of equipment is done as a preventive safety measure.  
 
7. How do safety meetings feel?  
7.1. In my lab, group meetings are not appropriate moments to discuss about safety concerns. 
7.2. My PI established mandatory safety discussions.  
7.3. When an accident occurs, the whole team is concerned. 
7.4. Safety issues can be discussed anytime with all the lab. 
7.5. I feel recognition when I discuss a safety problem that concern the whole lab.  
 
8. Balance between HSE and profitability?  
8.1. I feel free to delay my work to solve safety issues. 
8.2. Money is the major consideration when discussing safety improvements. 
8.3. In my opinion, safety considerations may slow down researches. 
8.4. I think I can reach better performances if I work in a safe environment. 
 
9. Commitment level of workforce and level of care for colleagues?  
9.1. If I see a person in my lab doing something unsafe, I feel uncomfortable addressing the issue 
directly with him/her. 
9.2. My lab colleagues exert a strong peer pressure on me to work safely. 
9.3. Lab workers pay particular attention on new teammate in the lab. 
9.4. I consider equally both mine and other workers’ safety when working in the lab. 
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Appendix C Simplified framework for EPFL application 
Pathological Reactive Calculative Proactive Generative 
Incident/Accident reporting, [investigation and analysis] 
Incidents are not reported. 
[Investigations are seen as a 
loss of time when it 
concerns a minor incident.] 
Informal reporting and only 
immediate causes are 
spotted. [Little follow-up, no 
events shared.] 
Lot of reports, but no deep 
analysis. [Search for causes 
at workforce level.] 
Trained investigators, 
systematic follow-up to 
ensure change occurred and 
is maintained. Reports an 
learnings are shared. 
Deep investigations and 
analysis for a better 
understanding of how 
accidents happen by 
aggregating a wide range of 
incidents. Systematic follow-
up. 
Hazard and unsafe acts reports 
Non-compliance/near-
misses are common and 
totally ignored.  
Informal reporting of major 
near-misses. Focus on direct 
causes. 
Formal reports. PI 
emphasize the need to focus 
attention on personal 
environment and situations. 
PI’s set reporting goals. 
Reports focus on the “why”.  
Information is accessed by 
PIs and lab-workers and 
learnings are used in daily 
work. 
HSE consideration in experiment change management 
No HSE consideration when 
deviating a process. Focus 
on the quickest, cheapest, 
fastest execution and lot of 
data. 
Quick reflexion if a minor 
incident occurred in the past 
in a similar context. Time 
taken to do the job is the 
priority. 
Hazard analysis are 
mandatory for major change 
in the process and/or use of 
specific dangerous 
compounds (ex : pyrophoric, 
explosive, etc…). 
HSE aspects are regularly 
discussed with PI. Workers 
are not caught by routine 
when changing a process.  
HSE is a primordial aspect of 
change in a reaction. Deep 
analysis of deviation and 
what can happen, new 
elements involved, etc. 
Competency/Training – are workers interested? 
Training is a necessary evil. 
Attending only when it is 
compulsory.  
Training aimed at the 
person’s attitudes. Training 
specific to past accidents. 
Training involves new 
workers only. 
Competence matrices are 
present. Knowledge is 
tested. Training may be seen 
as relevant for a particular 
job. 
Training needs are 
identified. Leadership 
encourages training and 
workforce is proud to 
demonstrates skills.  
Attitudes is as important as 
knowledge and skills. 
Workers can propose/ask for 
specific training/method and 
get actively involved in the 
process.  
Who checks safety on a day-to-day basis? 
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No formal system. People 
take care of themselves. 
CoSEc are fictive position 
SCC involved in case of 
major incidents. No formal 
follow-up. CoSec are listen 
after incidents, for a short 
period of time. 
PI checks activities but not 
on a daily basis. Inspections 
aim at compliance with 
procedures. CoSec have an 
important influence to 
ensure compliance. 
Work team is encouraged. PI 
are present and dialogue 
with workers about safety. 
CoSec are seen as a reliable 
information source about 
safety. 
Everyone checks for safety 
for themselves and others. 
Experimentations are 
stopped when situation 
seems abnormal.  
Who causes the accidents in the eyes of management? 
Workers directly involved 
are blamed and seen as 
responsible. 
It is assumed accident are 
caused by “accident-prone” 
individuals, and corrective 
measures have to be taken. 
Technical issues are the 
main reasons of incidents 
(poor maintenance). 
Attempts to reduce 
exposure.  
PIs admit to be part of the 
blame and include process in 
accidents causes. 
Blame-free environment. PIs 
accept being responsible 
when root causes have not 
been solved. Each incidents 
is a lesson opportunity. 
How do safety meetings feel? 
Safety is not discussed. Safety is discussed 
reluctantly after incidents. 
Blaming is common. 
Discussions are regulated, 
there is small interactions.  
Safety is regularly discussed 
and meetings are used to 
identify problems before 
they occur.  
Safety is discussed every 
time it feels necessary. 
Discussions ensure 
awareness through all 
workers.  
Balance between HSE and profitability? 
Performance is the only 
concern. Safety is seen as 
costing money. 
Preventive maintenance is 
done, but costs are still 
important. 
Safety and performance are 
juggled rather than 
balanced. Safety is a 
discretionary expenditure. 
HSE is one of the priority, it 
is accepted that safety 
contributes to financial 
health (avoid costs). Delays 
may occur for safety 
reasons.  
HSE is not an issue. PI 
believe that safety increases 
performance. Delays are 
present until safety is not 
acceptable. 
Commitment level of workforce and level of care for colleagues? 
“who cares are long we 
don’t get caught”. Self-
interest only. 
Self-interest still the rule. 
Care for others occurs only 
after incidents. 
Awareness of failure costs is 
growing, but practical 
factors may prevent 
complete follow through. 
Pride is beginning to 
develop, increasing HSE 
involvement of workforce, 
but not universally. 
Standards are defined by the 
workforce. Level of 
commitment for care of 
colleagues is important.  
 
These sentences have been developed in order to simplify the chosen dimensions of Parker’s framework.
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Appendix D Adapted framework to EPFL organization 
Pathological Reactive Calculative Proactive Generative 
Incident/Accident reporting, [investigation and analysis] 
Many incidents are not 
reported. Investigations only 
takes places after a serious 
accident. Analyses don’t 
consider human factors or go 
beyond legal requirements. 
Priority on protection of the 
laboratory (public image, grant, 
etc.). 
 
There is an informal reporting 
system and investigation is 
aimed only at immediate 
causes, with a paper trail to 
show an investigation has taken 
place. Investigation focuses on 
finding guilty parties. There is 
little systematic follow up and 
previous similar event-share not 
considered. 
There are procedures producing 
lots of data and action items but 
opportunities to address the 
real issues are often missed. The 
search for causes is usually 
restricted to the level of the lab-
workers. 
There are trained investigators, 
with systematic follow-up to 
check that change has occurred 
and been maintained. Reports 
are sent to whole EPFL campus 
to share information and 
lessons learned. There is little 
creativity in imagining how the 
real underlying issues could 
affect the research. 
Investigation and analysis 
driven by a deep understanding 
of how accidents happen. Real 
issues identified by aggregating 
information from a wide range 
of incidents. Follow-up is 
systematic, to check that 
change occurs and is 
maintained. 
 
Hazard and unsafe acts reports 
Hazard and unsafe acts are not 
reported. 
Reporting is simple and factual. 
Focus is on determining who or 
what caused the situation. The 
Laboratory does not track 
actions after reports, neither do 
the Safety Competence Center 
Reports follow a fixed format 
for categorisation and 
documentation of observations. 
Number of reports is what 
counts. The Safety Competence 
Center requires complete forms 
without blanks. 
Reporting looks for “why” 
rather than just “what” or 
“when”. Quick submission of 
reports is appreciated, and 
blanks in forms can be filled in 
later. The Professor sets 
reporting goals. 
All levels actively access and use 
the information generated by 
reports in their daily work. 
Experiment planning, Safety, Lab-management 
There is no safety planning and 
little planning overall. What 
work planning there is 
concentrates on the quickest, 
fastest and cheapest execution. 
Safety planning is based on 
what went wrong in the past. 
There is an informal general 
planning process, based 
primarily on managing the time 
taken for a job. 
There is a lot of emphasis on 
hazard analysis. There is little 
use of feedback to improve 
planning, but people believe 
that the system is good and will 
prevent accidents. 
Planning is standard practice, 
with work and safety integrated 
in the plan. Plans are followed 
through and there is some 
evaluation of effectiveness by 
the Professor. 
There is a polished planning 
process with both anticipations 
of problems and reviews of the 
process. Lab-workers are 
trusted to do most planning. 
There is less paper, more 
thinking and the process is well 
known and disseminated.  
Competency/Training – are workers interested? 
Safety training is seen as a 
necessary evil. Attend training 
when it is compulsory by law. 
Lab-workers don’t mind 
Training is aimed at the person 
– “if we can change their 
attitude everything will be all 
right”. After an accident money 
Competence matrices are 
present and lots of standard 
training courses are given. 
Acquired course knowledge is 
Professor fully acknowledges 
the importance of tested skills 
on the job. The lab-workers are 
proud to demonstrate their 
Issues like attitudes become as 
important as knowledge and 
skills. Development is seen as a 
process rather than an event. 
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exchanging a harsh working 
environment for a couple of 
hours training off the job. 
is made available for specific 
training programmes. The 
training effort diminishes over 
time. 
  
tested. There is some on-the-
job transfer of techniques. 
 
 
skills in on-the-job assessment. 
Training needs start to be 
identified by lab-workers. 
 
Needs are identified and 
methods of acquiring skills are 
proposed by the lab-workers, 
who are an integral part of the 
process rather than just passive 
receivers.  
Who checks safety on a day-to-day basis? 
There is no formal system, so 
individuals take care of 
themselves as they see fit.  
 
 
Safety Competence Center 
checks laboratories after major 
incidents. Cursory site checks 
are performed by the Professor 
when he is visiting, mostly after 
incidents or inefficiencies. 
There is no formal system for 
follow-up. 
 
 
Laboratories activities are 
regularly checked by the 
Professor, but not on a daily 
basis. Inspections aim at 
compliance with procedures. 
 
The Professor encourage work 
teams to check for safety for 
themselves. Professors doing 
walk-rounds are seen as sincere. 
They engage lab-workers in 
dialogue. Internal cross-audits 
take place, involving Professors, 
CoSec and lab-workers. 
Everyone checks for hazards, 
looking out for themselves and 
their workmates. Professor’s 
inspections are largely 
unnecessary. There is no 
problem with demanding 
shutdowns of operations. 
 
Who causes the accidents in the eyes of management? 
Individuals are blamed, and it is 
believed that accidents are a 
part of the job. Responsibility 
for accidents is seen as 
belonging to those directly 
involved.  
There are attempts to remove 
‘accident-prone’ individuals. It is 
believed that accidents are 
often just bad luck. The 
responsibility of the system for 
accidents is considered but has 
no consequences. 
Faulty machinery and poor 
maintenance are identified as 
causes as well as people. There 
are attempts to reduce 
exposure. Professor has a Them, 
rather than Us, mentality and 
takes an individual rather than a 
system perspective. 
The Professor looks at the 
whole system, including 
processes and procedures when 
considering accident causes. He 
admit that they must take some 
of the blame. 
Blame is not an issue. The 
Professor accepts he could be 
responsible when assessing 
what he personally could have 
done to remove root causes. he 
takes a broad view looking at 
the interaction of systems and 
people. 
Importance of safety in group meetings? 
Safety discussions in group 
meetings, if any, are seen as a 
waste of time. They are run by 
the Professor. Conversation are 
often conflictual.  
Safety discussions are 
addressed reluctantly. They 
provide opportunities to point 
the finger of blame for 
incidents, and form a standard 
response to an accident. 
Toolbox meetings may be 
dominated by non-work issues. 
Meetings are like textbook 
discussions about EPFL policy 
with limited interaction. The 
regular scheduled safety 
discussions feel like overkill. 
Toolbox meetings are run on a 
strict agenda. 
Safety discussions feel like a 
genuine forum for interaction 
across the laboratory. At all 
levels, all meetings are safety 
meetings and are used to 
identify problems before they 
occur. 
Safety discussions can be called 
by any lab-workers, taking place 
in a relaxed atmosphere, and 
may be run by lab-workers 
themselves with Professor’s 
support. Safety discussions are 
short and focused on ensuring 
everyone is aware of what 
problems may arise. 
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Balance between safety and research performance? 
Research performance is the 
only concern. Safety is seen as 
costing money and time, and 
the only priority is to avoid extra 
costs and delays. 
Cost is important, but there is 
some investment in 
preventative maintenance. 
Operational factors dominate. 
Safety and research 
performance are juggled rather 
than balanced, with the 
Professor spending most of his 
time on operational issues. The 
Professor knows how to say the 
right things, but does not always 
walk his own talk. Safety is seen 
as a mandatory expenditure. If 
all contractors are 
unacceptable, the least bad is 
taken.  
The laboratory tries to make 
safety the top priority while 
understanding that it 
contributes to research 
performance and cost saving. 
The laboratory is quite good at 
juggling the two, and accepts 
delays to reach safety 
compliance. Money still counts. 
Safety and research 
performance are in balance, so 
that this become a non-issue. 
The Professor believes that 
safety saves money and allows a 
better research performance. 
The Laboratory accepts delays 
to reach safety compliance.  
Commitment level of workforce and level of care for colleagues? 
“Who cares as long we don’t get 
caught?” Individuals look after 
themselves. 
 
 
‘Look out for yourself’ is still a 
rule. There is a voided 
commitment to care for 
colleagues, after accidents, by 
both Professor and lab-workers, 
but this diminishes after a 
period of good safety 
performance. 
There is a trickle down of 
Professor’s increasing 
awareness of the costs of 
failure. People know how to pay 
lip service to safety, but 
practical factors may prevent 
complete follow through. 
Pride is beginning to develop, 
increasing lab-workers’ 
commitment to safety and their 
care for colleagues, but the 
feeling is not universal. 
Levels of commitment and care 
are very high and are driven by 
lab-workers who show passion 
about living up their aspirations. 
Standards are defined by the 
lab-workers. 
This table presents the adapted dimensions to EPFL organization. Respondent will have to choose for each dimension the typology that, according to them, 
corresponds to the climate within their laboratory.
69 
 
Appendix E Feedback presentation for pilot phase Labo-3 
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Appendix F Raw data from the survey 
Digital file available upon request. 
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Appendix G Summary of respondents’ remarks 
Remarks 
dimension 
1 
Everything that's 
enforced by DSPS is 
done, otherwise we try to 
do the least required to 
fulfil the DSPS 
recommendations 
not convinced by the 
answers 
 
Remarks 
dimension 
2 
As long as EPFL pays for 
the installation of the 
safety equipment (as 
ventilated cabinets, etc..) 
we aren't really bothered 
Proposed answers are 
very unclear to me 
 
Remarks 
dimension 
3 
I m so confused to find 
the difference between 
the answers 
Rather unclear sentences  
Remarks 
dimension 
4 
we mainly discuss DSPS 
regulations and how we'll 
manage the logistics of 
new regulations (e.g., 
who and how often will do 
the trash, etc.) 
  
Remarks 
dimension 
5 
But instead of the 
professor the main lab 
technician. 
In our lab, it is rather the 
CoSec and the 
technicians who look after 
the safety than the 
professor. 
 
Remarks 
dimension 
6 
There are always persons 
with different working 
styles with respect to 
safety, and when they 
come to the stage, you 
start asking yourself, why 
should you even bother if 
they are screwing 
everything up. I'm not a 
PI and I don't have a 
formal right to enforce 
any change in this 
situation. 
again unclear 
propositions 
 
Remarks 
dimension 
7 
Sayings from PI like "I 
don't care, but that's your 
job that it gets fixed" are 
often heard 
  
Remarks 
dimension 
8 
there haven't been any 
incidents that I would be 
aware of 
DSPS only is active 
yearly during the 
checkup, I think that it is 
one of the major factors 
preventing us from 
following the guidelines 
constantly. I have to 
admit though that from 
every visit our general 
behaviour gets better and 
better, so when it's time 
to prepare for the yearly 
checkup we have to do 
less and less every year. 
I would say that I really 
don't know how it works 
since I haven't seen any 
formal investigation of 
accidents 
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Remarks dimension 9 
I have not yet met our CoSec, who is in office solely due to political reasons. Thus, no one has / 
takes responsibility for safety issues. 
There're a number of people in the lab who're more vigilant than the others and those will work with 
CoSec to ensure the lab safety is in place 
No idea what CoSecs are 
Why not several answers here ? 
CoSecs take on an enormous responsibility in addition to their normal workload. In my opnnion, the 
systems in palce at EPFL do not do enough to support these individuals and offer little compensation 
and even less incentive for people to want to become a CoSec. (I am not a CoSec, just an 
observer). 
What is CoSecs? 
 
Have you any remark on this survey, the project, etc.? 
The answers are to pin-pointed and do not fit all the scenarios 
Sometimes, the choices seem to be unneccesarily long. 
As of now, most of my responses to the survey are hypothetical, as a major accident has not 
occurred during my time in this lab. 
Having a true responsible (CoSec) who is knowledgable (qualified) and who introduces new 
members to potential hazards, would be great. in our interdisciplinary lab, backgrounds vary greatly 
and thus knowledge of and about hazards and potential sources for hazards vary greatly too. not 
trusting others to actually know what they are doing, makes me weary & play by "everyone for 
themselves" rules, yet still considering not to inflict danger onto others. 
The answers are too long and sometimes my answer would be a mixed of two or three or I just know 
part of the story. 
The questionnaire is a bit vague, it takes a lot of time to actually understand the difference between 
the options in this survey, and then it's a trouble to find the better fit. Try improving! Or maybe it's 
only English version like this? 
I think the questionnaire does not really take into account the activities in the field, which have rather 
specific issues compared to laboratory work 
Safey in the lab is also about having locked doors that can be open with camipro card. In CH, we 
don't have that. So anyone can enter labs, access our computers/machines, steal chemicals, ruin 
years and years of research. I was hoping that this survey would have a question about that. 
When no incident happened, it is quite hard to answer 
The 5 answer suggestions were always very specific, and often none of them did really fit the 
situation in the lab. So I chose the one I thought was closest to our "reality". 
The SCC team should rather act as a reliable partner to help the research groups to improve their 
procedures than just acting by repression, proposing solutions which are hardly applicable in an 
academic environment. 
The questionnaire is too complex the formulation of the answers is way too complex and hinders the 
understanding and the true meaning behind the question. Moreover the answers from which we 
chose should be much shorter and directed towards the point. For many questions I didn't see which 
answer was fitting my case as they were extremely non precise and complete to understand. Overall 
I think this survey will produced results highly biased by the answer choices you gave and the way 
you formulated in a hard to understand manner. 
The proposed answer generally don't match what I did like to answer. It is hard to see the differences 
between them 
Some choices are obscure, sometimes don't cover all situations 
I think that the answers are too detailed. I think that a better survey could have been done asking for 
numeric values about each of the details mentioned 
Propositions throughout the survey are often unclear/reduntant 
The responses are quite dense. Could be particularly challenging for those for whom English is not 
their first language. 
At lot of the questions are written in a way that kind of assumes that accidents happens regularly. I 
don't think this is the case. Regarding the safety at EPFL, there is little or almost no focus on 
consequences of long time exposure to chemicals. For instance, working with solvents outside fume 
hoods seems to be normal in many labs at EPFL. Finally, inspections of labs at EPFL are 
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announced, hence we are always asked to clean the labs before the inspections. Those performing 
the inspections do not see how the labs normally looks like. This is a problem! 
Sometimes difficult to relate to the suggested answers, which are more oriented from the point of 
view of a safety analsysis thant that of a person working in a lab everyday, maybe more examples 
would help, like situation to illustrate each option... 
Don't see what the goal is... If it's to show that safety is not the main concern of every lab, we already 
know it thank you 
Some questions are written in a way that can be difficult to understand for non-native english speaker 
 
Remarques 
dimension 2 
"lje ne peux pas répondre ce que 
pense mon professeur ! 
La sécurité est un terme générique. 
Certaines normes toutefois sont 
concretement contre productive et voir 
même plus dangereuse une fois mise 
en place. 
Remarques 
dimension 3 
Chaque Laboratoire à des besoin en 
sécurité different. Il serait interessant 
de faire un bilan regulier (2-5ans) des 
besoin en securité spécifique de 
chaque laboratoire (à définir en 
fonction d'un audit/entretien) et de faire 
des modules pour les personnes 
concernées de tous les labos. 
 
Remarques 
dimension 4 
Disscutions abordées à contrecoeur, 
oui, mais tout le monde saisit leurs 
importances 
 
Remarques 
dimension 5 
le point 1 correspond le mieux a notre 
situation, mais le role décrit par le 
professeur ici est plutôt délégué au 
cosec. 
 
Remarques 
dimension 6 
la dernière parti de ce point est très 
important : dans le laboratoire, chacun 
joue un role très different en terme de 
sécurité. certains sont attentifs aux 
autres, d'autres meme pas attentifs á 
eux meme. 
 
Remarques 
dimension 7 
Difficile à dire pour ma part...  
Remarques 
dimension 8 
Pas connu d'accident, les incidents 
sont reportés oralement et au plus vite 
au professeur pour trouver une solution 
la declaration d'incidents ne concerne 
souvent que les accidents sérieux. 
dans ce cas le suivie fait par le dsps est 
constructif. pour les "incidents", des 
mesures correctement peuvent être 
prise au niveau du laboratoire si les 
causes sont déterminées facilement. 
Remarques 
dimension 9 
le cosec sert de delegué du professeur 
dans le labo, et doit signaler les 
problèmes. sa capacité d'action ou de 
persuasion peut être assez restreinte. 
 
 
Avez-vous des remarques sur le sondage, le projet, etc...? 
souvent dur de se retrouver dans une des réponses 
Il faudrait rendre les différentes options plus claires (moins de texte !)  
Des réponses peut-être trop précises qui rendent les réponses appropriées dures 
Les réponses possibles sont trop spécifiques et longues. Plus de réponses plus courtes avec la 
possibilité de réponses multiples aurait été préférable. 
J'ai majoritairement répondu en dépi plutôt que par conviction à ce questionnaire. Je trouve que les 
question n'aborde pas les vrais questions de fond qui sont: "Comment faire respecter des normes 
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généralistes à des Laboratoires si différents? Comment faire un suivi et une adaptation de ces 
normes pour les besoins spécifiques de chaque laboratoire? Quels sont les moyens mis en place 
et mise à disposition par le service de sécurité pour faire un suivi et verifier les modifications faite? 
répondre aux questions? ouvrir un dialogue constructif pour le bien de tous? 
Le questionnaire dans sa globalité n'est pas formulé de manière adéquate par rapport à la gestion 
existante de la sécurité à l'EPFL! 
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Appendix H Safety climate survey 
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